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Abstract
ALASALMI JUHO, Motivated Prospects of Upward Mobility
Master’s Thesis: 69 pages and 8 appendix pages
May, 2018
The prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis conjectures that the reason
why the poor do not expropriate the rich and sometimes seem to vote against their self-
interest is that they expect to move upward in the income ladder and fear that the higher
redistribution may negatively affect them in the future. This thesis explicitly models the
beliefs agents have about their future income and studies how and when these beliefs can
be overly optimistic resulting in low redistribution.
The model of motivated prospects of upward mobility is built on a model proposed
by Minozzi (2013) and differs from it in that this work adopts a cognitive technology of
belief distortion from Be´nabou and Tirole (2002). In the model, agents collectively choose
a linear tax rate under uncertainty about their exogenous future incomes. In addition to
the utility from consumption, agents derive utility from the anticipation of their future
consumption. This incentivizes them to distort their beliefs. Given the technology for
belief distortion, the motivated prospects of upward mobility emerge endogenously as a
result of agents’ choices between anticipation and consumption.
When belief formation and voting are strategic, the poor will form overly optimistic
beliefs and vote for low taxes if the value of anticipation is high enough and if their
optimism does not cause too drastic a change in tax policy. If belief formation and voting
are non-strategic, the poor will always indulge in optimism and may even vote against
their own best interest. A striking result is that if the incomes of the rich increase as the
transfers to the poor stagnate, the poor may demand less redistribution. That is, contrary
to the classic benchmark model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), an increase in inequality
does not necessarily lead to an increase in demand for redistribution. It is also shown,
how Minozzi’s (2013) model is a special case of fully naive inference and that Minozzi’s
results are not robust to Bayesian rational agents.
Lastly, a dichotomy between naive and sophisticated cognitive technologies for en-
dogenous belief distortion in the literature of psychological economics is identified, and
a general model of motivated beliefs which brings these various cognitive technologies
together and shows how they relate is proposed.
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Hypoteesi ylo¨spa¨in suuntautuvan tuloliikkuvuuden mahdollisuudesta tarjoaa selityk-
sen sille, miksi va¨ha¨tuloinen a¨a¨nesta¨jien enemmisto¨ ei a¨a¨nesta¨ korkeita veroja, vaikka
se olisi heida¨n etujensa mukaista. Hypoteesin mukaan va¨ha¨tuloiset a¨a¨nesta¨ja¨t uskovat
heida¨n tulojensa kasvavan ja pelka¨a¨va¨t etta¨ korkea tulovero tulevaisuudessa on heille it-
selleen vahingollinen. Ta¨ma¨ tutkielma mallintaa agenttien uskomukset heida¨n tulevaisuu-
den tuloistaan ja tutkii, kuinka na¨ma¨ uskomukset voivat olla ylioptimistisia johtaen
va¨ha¨iseen tulonjakoon.
Tutkielman malli motivoiduista ylo¨spa¨in suuntautuvan tuloliikkuvuuden na¨kymista¨
rakentuu Minozzin (2013) ehdottaman mallin pa¨a¨lle, mutta eroaa kyseisesta¨ mallista
hyo¨dynta¨es-sa¨a¨n Be´naboun ja Tirolen (2002) ehdottamaa uskomusten va¨a¨rista¨misen kog-
nitiivista teknologiaa. Mallissa agentit valitsevat kollektiivisesti lineaarisen tuloveron ol-
lessaan epa¨varmoja tulevaisuuden eksogeenisista tuloistaan. Kulutuksen lisa¨ksi agenteille
tuo hyo¨tya¨ heida¨n tulevaisuuden kulutuksensa ennakointi, mika¨ luo heille kannustimen
va¨a¨rista¨a¨ heida¨n uskomuksiaan. Motivoidut uskomukset ylo¨spa¨in suuntautuvan tuloliik-
kuvuuden mahdollisuuksista syntyva¨t endogeenisesti agenttien valitessa kulutuksen ja
kulutuksen ennakoinnin tuovan hyo¨dyn va¨lilta¨ kognitiivisen teknologian asettamien ra-
joitteiden vallitessa.
Kun uskomusten muodostaminen ja a¨a¨nesta¨minen ovat strategista, va¨ha¨tuloisten a¨a¨-
nesta¨jien uskomukset ovat ylioptimistisia, ja he a¨a¨nesta¨va¨t alhaista tulojen uudellenjakoa,
jos kulutuksen ennakoinnista tuleva hyo¨ty on tarpeeksi suuri ja jos heida¨n optimisminsa
ei aiheuta liian suurta muutosta veropolitiikassa. Jos uskomusten muodostaminen ja
a¨a¨nesta¨minen eiva¨t ole strategista, va¨ha¨tuloisten a¨a¨nesta¨jien uskomukset ovat aina yliop-
timistisia, ja he voivat jopa a¨a¨nesta¨a¨ omien etujensa vastaisesti. Ylla¨tta¨va¨ tulos on,
etta¨ jos suurituloisten a¨a¨nesta¨jien tulot nousevat siten, etta¨ tulonsiirrot va¨ha¨tuloisille
a¨a¨nesta¨jille pysyva¨t ennallaan, va¨ha¨tuloisten a¨a¨nesta¨jien kysynta¨ tulojen uudelleenjaolle
voi laskea. Vastoin klassisen Meltzerin ja Richardin (1981) esitta¨ma¨n mallin tulok-
sia, ta¨ma¨n tutkielman mallissa tuloerojen kasvu voi siis va¨henta¨a¨ tulojen uudelleenjaon
kysynta¨a¨. Tutkielma na¨ytta¨a¨ myo¨s, kuinka Minozzin (2013) malli on naiivin pa¨a¨ttelyn
erikoistapaus ja etta¨ Minozzin tulokset eiva¨t kesta¨ bayesila¨ista¨ rationaalisuutta.
Lopuksi, tutkielma tunnistaa kahtiajaon naiivien ja sofistikoituneiden kognitiivisten
teknologioiden va¨lilla¨ psykologisen taloustieteen kirjallisuudessa ja kehitta¨a¨ endogeeni-
sesti motivoitujen uskomusten yleisen mallin. Ta¨ma¨n mallin avulla tutkielma na¨ytta¨a¨,
kuinka na¨ma¨ erilaiset kognitiiviset teknologiat liittyva¨t toisiinsa.
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Notation
Sections 3 and 4
Exogenous variables and parameters
δ Discount factor.
q Share of likely rich agents.
s ”Savoring” parameter, measures the importance of anticipatory utility.
τ Lower bound of the allowed tax rates.
τ Upper bound of the allowed tax rates.
yH Expected period 2 income of the likely rich agents, mean of FH .
yL Expected period 2 income of the likely poor agents, mean of FL.
χ Naivete parameter.
Endogenous variables
ci Period 2 consumption of agent i.
Ft,i Period t information of agent i.
λ Awareness rate of the likely poor.
λ Optimal awareness rate of the likely poor given λ ∈ [0, 1
2(1−q)
)
.
λ Optimal awareness rate of the likely poor given λ ∈ [ 1
2(1−q) , 1
]
.
λ∗ Optimal awareness rate of the likely poor.
s∗ Threshold level in importance of anticipation in case τ ∈ [0, 1].
s∗∗ Threshold level in importance of anticipation in case τ ∈ [τ , τ ].
s∗∗∗ Threshold level in importance of anticipation above which the likely rich
are
worse off with low taxes.
σi Signal agent i receives in period 0.
σˆi Signal agent i memorizes (sends) in period 0 and recalls (receives) in
period 1.
τ Income tax rate.
τ ∗ Equilibrium tax rate.
τ ∗i Optimal tax rate for agent i.
yi Income of agent i.
y¯ Average income.
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Others
FL Income distribution of the likely poor in period 2.
FH Income distribution of the likely rich in period 2.
F Set of possible income distributions in period 2.
g(·) Probability mass function of the signal agent receives in period 0.
Σi Signal set of agent i.
i Agent index.
ιgross(λ|χ) Expectation of expected period 2 gross income of the likely poor in period
1 from the point of view of period 0 as a function of λ given χ.
ιnet(λ, τ) Expectation of expected period 2 consumption of the likely poor in period
1 from the point of view of period 0 as a function of λ given τ .
r(λi|χ) The reliability of received signal as a function of period 0 strategy given
χ.
ut,i(·) Intertemporal utility of agent i in period t.
Uλ
′
0,i Expected utility of the likely poor in period 0 given choice of λ = λ
′.
U0,i(λ) Expected utility of the likely poor in period 0 as a function of λ.
Section 5
Exogenous variables and parameters
δ Discount factor.
θH High type in the simple game of motivated beliefs.
θL Low type in the simple game of motivated beliefs.
s ”Savoring” parameter, measures the importance of anticipatory utility.
q Probability of being of type θH in the simple game of motivated beliefs.
χ Naivete parameter.
Endogenous variables
βi Behavioral strategy of Self 1 of agent i.
β∗i Optimal behavioral strategy of Self 1 of agent i.
γ Probability of choosing σˆ = θL given signal σ = θH in the simple game
of motivated beliefs.
F0,i Information of Self 0 of agent i in period 0.
F1,i Information of Self 1 of agent i in period 1.
θi Type of agent i.
λ Probability of choosing σˆ = θL given signal σ = θL in the simple game
of motivated beliefs.
σˆi Pure action of Self 0 of agent i.
φi Mixed strategy of Self 0 of agent i.
φ∗i Optimal mixed strategy of Self 0 of agent i.
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Others
A Set of actions.
A(h) Set of actions available in history h.
A(h) Set of lotteries over the set A(h).
β Profile of strategies of Self 1s.
Bi Set of behavioral strategies available to Self 1 of agent i.
Γ General extensive form game.
Γ′ An extensive form game with perfect information and chance moves.
Γ(σi) A game with heterogeneous beliefs where the players are Self 1s of each
agent and agent i’s beliefs over θ are given by the distribution G(θ|σi).
gi(σ) Probability of Self 0 of agent i receiving signal σ.
G(·) Joint probability distribution of types.
G(·|σ) Distribution over θ conditional on the information of signal σ.
F0,i Set of possible posterior distributions for Self 0 of agent i of θ in period
0.
H Set of histories.
θ Vector of types.
Θ Set of possible types.
I Information partition.
N Set of agents.
pi(·|σˆ, χ) Probability weights of nonrecalled signals implied by Bayes Rule.
P Player assignment function.
r(·|σˆ, χ) Belief system that assigns a probability to each original signal when re-
calling signal σˆ.
r Profile of belief systems.
σ Profile of signals Self 0s receive.
σi Signal function of agent i, signal Self 0 of agent i receives.
Σi Signal set of agent i.
σˆ Profile of signals Self 1s recall.
u(β, θ) Utility function representing preferences over terminal histories in Γ.
u1,i(β, θ) Utility function representing Self 1’s preferences over terminal histories
in the continuation game.
u0,i(β, θ) Utility function representing Self 0’s preferences over terminal histories
in the pre-game.
U0,i(φ, σ) Expected utility of Self 0 as a function of strategy profile of Self 0s and
given information implied by signal σ.
φ Profile of strategies of Self 0s.
Φi Set of mixed strategies of Self 0 of agent i.
P(·) Power set.
Ω Set of possible states of the world.
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1 Introduction
Fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. (Men readily believe what they want to believe.)
— Julius Caesar, Commentarii de Bello Gallico (Commentaries on the Gallic War)
The prospect of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis conjectures that the reason
why the poor do not expropriate the rich and sometimes seem to vote against their self-
interest is that they expect to move upward in the income ladder and fear that the higher
redistribution may negatively affect them in the future. This work attempts to formalize
the POUM hypothesis by explicitly modeling the voters’ beliefs about their prospective
incomes. Under certain conditions, enough of the poor believe that they will be rich in
the future and the electorate chooses low redistribution.
Previously, the POUM hypothesis has been formalized by Be´nabou and Ok (2001).
They show that under favorable income dynamics, it is possible that more than half of
the voters have an above average expected future income. As a result, more than half
of the voters prefer low distribution and vote accordingly. While, according to empirical
evidence, both perceived upward mobility (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000; Cojoracu, 2014)
and actual upward mobility (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009;
Checchi and Filippin, 2003; Be´nabou and Ok, 2001) seem to decrease voters’ demand for
redistribution, it also seems that perceived mobility and actual mobility do not necessarily
correlate (Fischer, 2009; Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2001; Gottschalk and Spolaore,
2001). The puzzle then, and what the model in Be´nabou and Ok (2001) fails to explain
is why prospects of upward mobility decrease the demand for redistribution even in the
absence of actual upward mobility. For instance, in the US, the perceived upward mobility
is higher than in Europe, producing a higher POUM effect while there does not seem to
be much difference in actual upward mobility across the Atlantic (Alesina, Glaeser and
Sacerdote, 2001; Gottschalk and Spolaore, 2001). In addition, as noted by Alesina and
Giuliano (2009) and Minozzi (2013), the assumptions underlying the model of Be´nabou
and Ok (2001) are restrictive and empirically implausible. Therefore, Alesina and Giuliano
(2009) suggests that a more plausible mechanism for the POUM effect could be over-
optimism. This suggestion is supported by a vast literature in experimental psychology
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on overconfidence (Weinstein, 1980; Moore and Healy 2008; Alicke and Govorun, 2005).1
Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2012) find evidence on how the relatively poor tend to
overestimate their current position in the income distribution. It would not be unexpected
to observe a similar pattern when it comes to their future incomes.
A formalization of the POUM hypothesis which lets voters have overly optimistic
beliefs about their future incomes is provided by Minozzi (2013). In Minozzi’s model,
citizens vote on future redistribution under uncertainty over their future incomes. When
expecting their future consumption, they enjoy anticipation which incentivizes them to
hold optimistic beliefs. The weakness of this model is, however, in its naive technology
of belief distortion, which allows citizens to effectively decide what to believe and leaves
them with no doubts of whether their beliefs truly represent the reality. This might be too
simplistic an assumption and potentially misses important mechanisms of belief distortion
as argued by Be´nabou and Tirole (2002).
The present work attempts to address these problems in the previously proposed mod-
els. The basic structure of our model is similar to Minozzi’s (2013) model: When voting
for a tax rate according to which the future incomes will be redistributed, agents have
uncertainty over their future incomes. After voting and before the realization and redis-
tribution of their incomes, they anticipate their future consumption. This anticipation
creates an incentive to form overly optimistic beliefs. The departure of the current work
from Minozzi’s (2013) model is most notably in the technology that agents use to distort
their beliefs. The cognitive technology for belief distortion in the current work is adopted
and adapted from Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) and generalized such that we are able to
analyze a whole continuum of cognitive technologies varying in the constraints they im-
pose on belief distortion. The conditions for the POUM effect are derived for each of
these cognitive technologies, and it is shown that for a set of cognitive technologies the
poor prefer optimism and low taxes over realism and high taxes. Furthermore, in addition
to strategic belief formation and voting, we consider sincere belief formation and voting
as well, and show that when the voters do not think that their beliefs and voting have
a significant effect on the tax policy, they always indulge in optimism and may end up
making nonoptimal decisions for themselves.
1See also references in Weinberg (2009).
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The literature on psychological economics has proposed a number of ways of modeling
biases in beliefs as an optimization problem where the trade-off between the benefits and
costs of holding biased beliefs is balanced (Akerlof and Dickens, 1984; Be´nabou and Tirole,
2002, 2016; Be´nabou, 2015; Minozzi, 2013; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005). The general
cognitive technology for belief distortion presented in this work allows us to see how
these different cognitive technologies in the literature which have not so far been analyzed
together, relate to each other in a simple way: They represent the polar specifications of
the strategic sophistication of agents and the dependence of beliefs on prior beliefs and
the objective reality.
This work aims to make the following contributions: (1) As a contribution to the liter-
ature of political economy and redistribution, it formalizes the POUM effect by explicitly
modeling the overly optimistic beliefs of voters and analyzes the conditions that are re-
quired for the POUM effect to occur. It also shows how the results of a similar model
in Minozzi (2013) are not robust to a more realistic cognitive technology which does not
allow the voters to simply choose their beliefs, but takes account the constraints of belief
distortion. (2) As a contribution to the literature of psychological economics, it brings
together the various technologies for belief distortion in the partly independent strands of
literature and shows how they relate. Also, a general cognitive technology which allows
us to consider a range of assumptions about the strategic sophistication of agents and the
constraints of biased beliefs is provided.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly position the current
work into the existing literature in political economy and psychological economics. Section
3 presents the model and derives the conditions for the POUM effect. Also, Minozzi’s
POUM model is derived as a special case, and its shortcomings are addressed. Section
4 extends the analysis of the model by studying the comparative statistics of changes
in the underlying income distribution, presents some welfare analysis and considers the
case of nonstrategic belief formation and voting. In section 5, the modeling concepts and
analytic tools used to model motivated endogeneous beliefs are reviewed, a more general
version of the cognitive technology is presented, and the connection between naive and
sophisticated technologies is made. Section 6 concludes. All proofs of the lemmas and
propositions are collected in the appendix.
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2 Relations to the literature
2.1 Political Economy and Redistribution
If the rational choice model with narrowly defined utility together with the Median Voter
Theorem cannot be corroborated by empirical observations, either of these underlying
assumptions, rational choice or median voter’s power, must be wrong. It might either
be the case that modeling voters as income maximizing agents does not capture all the
relevant aspects of their decision making or that the outcome that the electoral system
provides does not reflect the preferences of the median voter. Reasons for the latter
could be, for instance, unequal political participation (Be´nabou, 2000; Mahler, 2008), the
political influence of the rich (Gilens, 2005), campaign contributions (Baremboim and
Karabarbounis, 2008; Campante, 2007; Rodriguez, 2004), economic inequality (Lupu and
Pontusson, 2011; Solt, 2008), electoral systems (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Cukierman and
Spiegel, 2003; Austen-Smith, 2000), and interest groups (Dixit and Londregran, 1998).
In this work, the policy outcome is assumed to be the median voter’s bliss point and
the focus, therefore, is on the former of these possible caveats. Hence, this work can
be positioned into the strand of literature initiated by Romer (1975) and Meltzer and
Richard (1981), which aims to explain the extent of redistribution in democratic societies
by studying what determines the voters’ demand for redistributive policies. To ensure
the existence of political equilibrium, this literature mostly focuses on unidimensional
policy choices, usually choices over a linear tax rate with lump-sum transfers. With this
simplification, the policy preferences of voters are single-crossing, and the median voter
theorem applies. The remaining question then, and the interest of this literature is how
does the median voter decide on her vote.
The obvious starting point is the voter’s current income, but preferences so narrowly
defined have been unsatisfactory in explaining real-world tax policies (Be´nabou, 1996;
Borck, 2007; Luebker, 2014). Other factors explaining the demand for redistribution
proposed in this literature are, for instance, efficiency costs of taxation (Meltzer and
Richard, 1981), different individual (Piketty, 1995; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2008) and
cultural (Corneo and Gruner, 2002; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004) histories and experiences,
social preferences such as altruism, inequality aversion and fairness considerations (Alesina
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and Glaeser, 2004; Fong, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005a; Alesina et al. 2012 ),
structure and organization of the family (Todd, 1985; Esping Andersen, 1999; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2007), and social mobility (Piketty, 1995; Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973;
Be´nabou and Ok, 2001).2 In addition to increasing the scope of preferences, the literature
has also studied the role of beliefs (Piketty 1995, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005a) and biased
beliefs (Minozzi, 2013; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006; Be´nabou, 2008). Given this rich set of
explanations for the extent of redistribution, a parsimonious model seems unlikely, and
a single effect should be interpreted as a part of the story, complementing and rivaling
the other explanations. The part of the story we focus from now on in this work is the
POUM effect.
First, social mobility, broadly speaking, refers to both upward and downward mobility.
The premise is that instead of current income, the policy preferences depend on future
income. When voters are worried that their incomes might decrease relative to others,
they could use redistribution as insurance against downward mobility. This would increase
the demand for redistribution. The POUM, on the other hand, focuses on the possibility
of upward mobility, which has the opposite effect: When the voters expect their incomes
to increase relative to others, they vote for less redistribution.
However, social mobility is also often connected to the roles of luck, circumstances, and
effort in determining income. If the voters perceive that the effort one exerts determines
one’s prospects, then they can believe in a mobile society, but if they believe that the
circumstances have a major role in determining one’s prospects, then they believe in
immobile society. Piketty (1995) studies how the interaction of social mobility and beliefs
about determinants of income affects voting. In the present work, incomes are exogenous
and, in the spirit of the POUM hypothesis, beliefs about social mobility refer solely to
beliefs about future incomes.
The first characterization of the POUM effect is perhaps Hirschman’s (1973) ”tunnel
effect” in which people’s demand for redistribution decreases when they see the incomes
of relatable people in their environment increase. They expect that their turn will follow
soon and they, therefore, tolerate more inequality.
The first formalization of the POUM effect was provided by Be´nabou and Ok (2001).
2A review on the preferences for redistribution is provided by Alesina and Giuliano (2009).
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Their approach is to maintain rational expectations and show that favorable income dy-
namics can make more than half of the voters to expect above-average incomes. The
agents vote for a redistribution policy, which will be in place for a predetermined time,
and expect their incomes to evolve according to a stochastic transition function. The
deterministic part of this transition function is concave, which allows a majority of voters
to believe that they will receive an above average income in future. The stochastic part
consists of skewed income shocks, which ensure that the skewness of the original income
distribution is preserved. The combination of skewed shocks and concave prospects lets
the expected incomes and realized incomes diverge and makes the POUM effect possible
with invariant income distribution and rational expectations.
Minozzi (2013) develops an ”Endogenous Beliefs Model” and proposes an explanation
for the POUM effect by abandoning rational expectations and letting voters form overly
optimistic prospects about their future income. Minozzi’s model relies on a game theoretic
multi-self approach, where each citizen has without their knowledge an ”agent”, who
controls their beliefs and optimizes the trade-off between optimistic beliefs and nonoptimal
actions. Citizens receive an anticipatory flow utility in period 1 and a flow utility called
outcome utility in period 2, when they receive their stochastic and exogenous incomes.
The agent’s objective function for belief formation consists of these two sources of utility.
In choosing the optimal beliefs by solving the trade-off between anticipatory and outcome
utility, the agent knows the prior prospects of the citizen and how the tax policy is
dependent on the chosen beliefs. If the poor citizens value anticipation enough, they will
end up with optimistic beliefs and vote for low redistribution.
The POUM effect also emerges in the model of Be´nabou and Tirole (2006). In their
model agents compensate for their imperfect willpower by motivating themselves with
overly optimistic beliefs about their productive ability. When they believe themselves to
be abler than others, they prefer less redistribution. Although their model, as the present
work, derives the POUM effect by letting agents hold overly optimistic beliefs, their
work differs from the current in its mechanism for the belief distortion. Specifically, what
incentivizes the agents to hold biased beliefs differs. However, these different incentives are
not mutually exclusive, and probably both are at work. The explanation for the POUM
effect in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) should, therefore, be seen as a complementary to the
9
current work.
2.2 Psychological Economics and Motivated Beliefs
Psychological economics attempts to draw inspiration from the field of psychology and
build models that better represent the cognitive processes of decision makers aiming to
close the apparent gap between the observed behavior of people and the behavior postu-
lated by the rational choice theory. The rational choice theory is, however, the primary
method of analysis in economics and the work in psychological economics, rather than
abandoning this theory, proceeds by widening its scope.3 The current work broadens the
rational choice theory to accommodate psychological factors in two ways. First, we widen
the scope of preferences to include anticipation of future consumption. Second, we let
agents make optimal decisions about their beliefs.
Anticipatory utility is perhaps little used but certainly not a new idea in the literature
of economics: ”When calculating the rate at which future benefit is discounted, we must
be careful to make allowance for the pleasures of expectation”, writes Alfred Marshall in
his Principles of Economics published in 1891 (p. 178, quoted in Lo¨wenstein (1987)).
Our mind is both an information processing machine by which we make our decisions and
a consuming organ deriving satisfaction from our emotions, as Thomas Schelling (1987)
put it. That is, we use our beliefs to predict the consequences of our actions, but we also
consume them. Due to this latter function of beliefs, we derive utility or incur disutility
simply by believing certain things. As experiments have shown, this consumption value of
beliefs has consequences for our information processing (Kunda, 1990; Averill and Rosenn
1972; Lerman et al. 1998) and our behavior (Cook and Barnes 1964; Lo¨wenstein 1987).
Anticipatory utility is modeled usually by letting the utility function have a term
which is a linear (Minozzi, 2013; Be´nabou, 2008, 2013; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005)
or a general (Caplin and Leahy, 2001; Ko¨szegi, 2010; Bernheim and Thomadsen, 2005)
function of expectation of a later period utility flow. In Akerlof and Dickens (1982),
agents incur psychic costs of fear modeled as a ”fear cost function” which depends on the
perceived probability of an accident in their hazardous job.
In addition to preferences, the second important element of decisions in an uncertain
3On psychological economics, see, for instance, Rabin (2002) and Tirole (2002).
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world is beliefs. Hence, to understand decisions, it is crucial to understand beliefs. The
departure from rational expectations is motivated by vast literature in psychology (Wein-
stein, 1980; Moore and Healy, 2008; Alicke and Govorun, 2005) and behavioral economics
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1995; Skala, 2008). In addition to challenging the objectivity of
beliefs, the literature in psychology directs us towards the alternative options: Biases in
beliefs are not random, they seem to be incentivized and partly determined by desires
(Kunda, 1990; Braman and Nelson, 2007; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). This
literature of motivated reasoning asserts that human information processing, memories,
and beliefs are affected by our motivations. In addition to accuracy goals, reasoning can
be motivated by directional goals, that is, by desires and preferences.
The literature on motivated reasoning has inspired models of biased beliefs where
the beliefs are a result of optimizing the trade-off between accuracy goals and directional
goals. Anticipatory utility is one way to model such a directional goal for reasoning, but a
complete model also requires the means for belief distortion. We call a cognitive technology
a framework which provides the agents with the ways and constraints of distorting their
beliefs. There are roughly two kinds of cognitive technologies used in the literature. In
the first of these which we will call naive cognitive technologies, the beliefs can be simply
chosen, and they do not need to depend on the prior beliefs or the objective probability
distributions of reality. For instance, Minozzi (2013), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005),
and Akerlof and Dickens (1982) use a naive cognitive technology. We call the second kind
of cognitive technology a sophisticated cognitive technology. If the cognitive technology
is sophisticated, agents realize that they have incentives to bias their beliefs and assess
their beliefs accordingly. Also, the emerging beliefs are influenced by the prior beliefs and
are anchored to the reality. This second type of cognitive technology is used in Be´nabou
and Tirole (2002, 2006), Be´nabou (2008, 2013), and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005), and
reviewed in Be´nabou (2015) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2016). The names for these two
types of cognitive technologies follow from their different assumptions on the agents’
degree of Bayesian sophistication.
The present work attempts to close the gap between these two strands of literature
and show how these two types of cognitive technologies represent the extreme cases of one
general framework. A cognitive technology that best represents the information processing
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of a human being is likely to be found in between these extremes. The framework of this
work allows us to study the implications of our model under the whole continuum of
cognitive technologies varying from the completely naive technology to the completely
sophisticated.
Minozzi (2013) calls the nonstandard beliefs that emerge in his model endogenous be-
liefs whereas Be´nabou (2015) refer to these beliefs as motivated beliefs.4 In this work,
these terms are used interchangeably. However, the term motivated beliefs is more infor-
mative. After all, all beliefs that are determined within a model, can be called endogenous.
For instance, in this sense, the usual rational expectations are endogenous beliefs as well.
To sum up, a model containing belief distortion has two crucial elements. First,
agents must have an incentive to hold biased beliefs. Using the language of Be´nabou
and Tirole (2002), this can be called the demand for distorted beliefs. In the current
work, agents are incentivized to have biased beliefs by letting them derive utility from
their high hopes. Second, agents must be able to influence their beliefs. This can be
called the supply of distorted beliefs. The current work considers the whole continuum of
cognitive technologies from the complete naive to the fully sophisticated, that make the
belief distortion possible. Given the incentives and the technology of belief formation,
biased subjective beliefs emerge as a result of optimization. This optimization involves
trading-off the benefits of holding biased beliefs against the costs of inferior decisions due
to inaccurate information and is subject to the constraints of the cognitive technology.
The emergence of non-standard beliefs as a result of optimization and purposeful actions
distinguishes the motivated beliefs framework from the mechanical failures of rationality
or bounded rationality, which leave the motivations of actions intact and only impose
constraints on reasoning (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2016).
4Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) call them optimal beliefs.
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Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Receive
signals σ
Choose λ
Recall σˆ and
form beliefs
Vote for
redistribution
Anticipation
Incomes realize
Redistribution
Consumption
Figure 1: Timeline
3 The Model
3.1 The Economy and the Timing of the Model
The economy consists of a unitary continuum i ∈ [0, 1] of risk-neutral agents who col-
lectively decide on a tax policy under uncertainty about their exogenous future incomes.
In period 0, agents receive a signal conveying information about their prospective future
incomes. In period 0, they also engage in various conscious and unconscious psychological
processes of belief distortion, reality denial, and information avoidance which determine
the signal they will remember in period 1.5 In the beginning of period 1, agents recall
a signal and form beliefs about their future incomes based on what they recall. Then
they vote for redistribution. They get to know the policy outcome immediately after the
vote, and in the rest of period 1 they experience anticipatory utility as they anticipate
their consumption which occurs in period 2 right after the incomes have realized and
redistributed. The timeline is given in Figure 1.
3.2 Information and Beliefs
In period 0, each agent receives a noisy signal σi ∈ F = {FL, FH} conveying information
about their future incomes. These signals are identical and independent draws from the
5Agents have imperfect recall in the sense that they forget information. The underlying game theoret-
ical construct to model this inconsistency is to model agents consisting of two players, their two temporal
selves. See section 5. Also, the parallel interpretation throughout the paper is that the parents have
influence over what their offsprings belief when the offsprings are making voting decisions.
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following probability mass function:
g(σ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩q if σ = FH1− q if σ = FL , (1)
where FH and FL are probability distributions over the future income levels such that∫
y
ydFH(y) >
∫
y
ydFL(y) and y ≥ 0.6 Using the language of Minozzi (2013), we call the
agents who receive signal σ = FH the likely rich and the agents who receive signal σ = FL
the likely poor. With a large number of agents, a fraction q of the population is likely
rich and a fraction 1− q likely poor. Furthermore, we assume that the likely poor agents
constitute a majority, that is, we assume q < 1
2
. As agents are risk-neutral, a sufficient
statistics for the analysis are the means of distributions FH and FL: yH =
∫
y
ydFH(y) and
yL =
∫
y
ydFL(y), the incomes that the likely rich and the likely poor, respectively, expect
to earn in period 2. In the following, we refer to these distributions by their means and
let the signal set be {yL, yH}.7
The possibility for belief distortion arises in the period 0 actions. After receiving a
signal, each agent decides which of the two signals she will recall in period 1. As we will
see, a likely poor agent has an incentive not to recall her true prospects. On the other
hand, we make a sensible assumption, that the likely rich agents will always choose to
remember the signal they received and they, therefore, have no interesting decision to
analyze. After all, if they underestimate their income, they lose anticipatory utility.8 We
6Here the signals are independent for simplicity and to induce some heterogeneity in the resulting
income distribution. In general, the signals may be correlated. The special case of perfectly correlated
types and signals can be used if the unknown variable is more common to agents in the sense that it
reflects some general workings of the economy, like return to effort as in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006),
government efficiency as in Be´nabou (2008) or expected value of a joint project as in Be´nabou (2013).
7We use a simplifying shortcut here. The underlying formal process, of course, is that Nature draws a
state of the world, which determines the incomes of each agent. Agents receive some information about
the state of the world via a signal determined by a signal function which lets them know a set of states
of the world. Using the prior belief and the signal they then form a posterior belief. The posterior belief
is, therefore, a function of the signal and fixed prior beliefs, so it is straightforward to associate a signal
with a posterior belief and let the outputs of the signal function be the posterior beliefs agents have
immediately after receiving the signal. Moreover, as the signal is a deterministic function of the state of
the world, which Nature draws, we can simply let the received signal have the given distribution. See
section 5 for a more technical and general presentation of the cognitive technology.
8This seems a very plausible conjecture but technically this is not that simple. Depending on the
off-equilibrium path beliefs, an agent sending a low signal might end up with higher beliefs than when
sending a high signal. In the appendix, we make an assumption about these off-equilibrium path beliefs
to exclude this peculiar theoretical possibility.
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focus mainly on the more interesting decisions of the likely poor agents. Formally, in
period 0, a likely poor agent i chooses a recall or an awareness rate λi ∈ [0, 1] defined as
λi ≡ Pr[σˆi = yL|σi = yL], (2)
where σˆi denotes both the signal agent i recalls in period 1 and the action she chooses in
period 0.9
In period 1, agent i’s information is based on a recalled signal σˆi ∈ {yL, yH}. The
memory of agents is probabilistic and their actions in period 0 determine the probability
of each recollection. With probability λi, a likely poor agent will correctly recall σˆi = yL
and with probability 1−λi, she will recall σˆi = yH . By assumption, the likely rich agents
always recall σˆi = yH . Of course, we are not claiming that people literally choose exact
probabilities for the occurrences of their future memories. The choices in period 0 should
be interpreted as all sorts of unconscious and conscious processes and actions that affect
the availability of certain recollections. In equilibrium, agents act as if they were choosing
optimal recall rates.
However, agents may not be completely in control of their beliefs. They may know
that they have a tendency to forget bad news and remember good news. Therefore, they
may not fully trust their recollections. If an agent i recalls σˆi = yH in the second period,
she will assign a reliability r(λi) to this signal:
r(λi|χ) = Pr[σi = yH |σˆi = yH ] = q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λi) , (3)
where λi is given by the period 0 strategy of agent i. χ is the naivete parameter measuring
the degree of Bayesian sophistication. χ = 1 corresponds to the full Bayesian rationality
which is usually assumed in the applications of game theory.10 In the other extreme,
χ = 0, and the reliability of received signal is always 1. This means that in period 1,
agents will completely trust their recollections and that in period 0, they are completely
in control of their beliefs in period 1. The role of χ will be analyzed extensively later.
9In the jargon of game theory, in period 0, an agent i plays a mixed strategy
(
yL yH
λi 1− λi
)
.
10Bayesian rationality refers to the use of Bayes rule in updating beliefs.
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Note that the reliability in (3) is defined only for the signal σˆi = yH . By assumption, only
the likely poor might send a signal σˆ = yL, so the reliability of this signal is always 1.
With probability 1 − λi, a likely poor agent recalls σˆi = yH and is an optimist. In
period 1, she expects a gross income
E[yi|F1,i] = r(λi)yH + (1− r(λi))yL, (4)
which is a linear combination of the expected incomes of the two different types weighted
by the reliability. F1,i is the information of agent i in period 1. Note how a decrease in λi
increases the probability of being an optimist and, as we will see, the expected anticipatory
utility. However, the effect is nonlinear for χ > 0 since the reliability decreases as λi
increases. The more likely it is that a likely poor agent i memorizes a false signal, the less
reliable signal σˆi = yH becomes. The more agents try to distort their beliefs, the more
cautious they are when they are forming their beliefs.
With probability λi, a likely poor agent recalls σˆi = yL and is a realist. As the
reliability of signal σˆi = yL is always 1, in period 1, she expects a gross income
E[yi|F1,i] = yL. (5)
The likely rich will recall σˆi = yH , and as they also do not know whether they truly are
likely rich or likely poor, their expected income will coincide with the expected income of
optimistic likely poor.
3.3 Preferences
In period 2, agents receive an exogenous income, pay taxes, and consume their disposable
income. The government’s budget is balanced, and all tax revenue collected via a linear
income tax is transferred in equal lump-sums to agents. There is no wastage in the
redistribution. Agents derive utility linearly from their consumption:
u2,i(ci) = ci(σi, τ) = (1− τ)yi + τ y¯, (6)
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where ci denotes consumption, τ is the income tax rate, and y¯ is the average income:
y¯ = qyH + (1− q)yL. (7)
In period 1, agents do not yet know their income, but given their beliefs, they form
expectations and experience a flow utility due to anticipation. The intertemporal prefer-
ences of agents from the perspective of period 1 are given by
u1,i(σˆi, τ) = sE[u2,i|F1,i] + δE[u2,i|F1,i] = (s+ δ)E[(1− τ)yi + τ y¯|F1,i], (8)
where the expectations are conditioned on the period 1 information F1,i, δ ∈ [0, 1] is the
standard discount factor and s ≥ 0 is the ”savoring” parameter which measures the im-
portance of anticipation. The anticipatory utility is proportional to agent’s expectations.
The higher expectations she has, the more utility she derives. This gives agents an incen-
tive to distort their beliefs. Setting s = 0 yields the standard case with no anticipatory
utility and therefore no incentive to distort beliefs. The discount factor and the savoring
parameter are common to all agents.
The intertemporal utility from the period 0 perspective is
u0,i(σi, σˆi, τ) = δE[sE[u2,i|F1,i]|F0,i] + δ2E[u2,i|F0,i]
= δsE[(1− τ)yi + τ y¯|F1,i] + δ2E[(1− τ)yi + τ y¯|F0,i]. (9)
The expected period 1 flow utility depends on the information in period 1 and the expected
period 2 flow utility depends on the information in the period 0.11 That is, in period 0,
agents know the true objective expectation of their incomes in period 2, but they also
know that they will receive higher utility in the period 1 if their beliefs in period 1 are
biased upwards. The trade-off, which the optimal period 0 actions optimize, can be seen
clearly here. Agents gain more utility if they have high hopes, but as we will see, with
high hopes they will vote for low taxation, which then lowers their consumption in the
last period.
11Note that since information is lost between periods 0 and 1 and F1,i contains less information than
F0,i the law of iterated expectations does not hold and E[sE[u2,i|F1,i]|F0,i] ̸= sE[u2,i|F0,i], but the smaller
information set wins and E[sE[u2,i|F1,i]|F0,i] = sE[u2,i|F1,i].
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3.4 The Polity and Voting Decisions
The agents vote for tax rate τ ∈ [τ , τ ] in the beginning of period 1. Their policy prefer-
ences are given by (8), and they depend on the subjective beliefs they have in period 1.
Maximization with respect to the tax rate leads to the following voting rule:12
τ ∗i =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩τ if E[yi|F1,i] ≥ y¯τ if E[yi|F1,i] < y¯ , (10)
where τ ∗i is the preferred tax rate of agent i. If an agent expects in period 1 to earn an
above average income in the period 2, she will vote for the minimum redistribution, and if
she expects to earn a below average income, she will vote for the maximum redistribution.
This parallels the classic result of Meltzer and Richard (1981). The linearity of the policy
preferences leads to corner solutions, which simplifies the analysis here. In reality, there
are, of course, additional considerations that restrict the tax policies between complete
equalization and complete laissez-faire. As we will see, setting τ < 1 and τ > 0 allows us
to exogenously restrict the set of feasible tax policies.
As the policy preferences given by (8) are single-peaked, the Median Voter Theorem
(Black, 1948; Downs, 1957) applies and the tax policy will be the tax rate preferred by the
median voter. With two groups of voters, the median voter’s opinion will be the opinion
of the majority.
If agents could not manipulate their expectations or if they did not have any incentives
to distort their beliefs (e.g., s = 0), they would vote according to their objective prospects,
and the unique equilibrium would be the likely poor voting for high taxes and the likely
rich voting for low taxes. The median voter would be among the likely poor, and the
policy in the unique equilibrium would be high taxes. We will see how the possibility of
subjective beliefs that differ from the objective standard allow additional equilibria with
other policy outcomes.
Throughout the analysis, we focus on the symmetric decisions within the two groups
12We assume that an indifferent agent votes for low taxes. This assumption turns out to be quite
crucial as it determines the tax policy in the low tax equilibrium of the model in the case of χ = 1. We
could, however, suppose, that there is an arbitrarily small amount of wastage involved in taxation, or
that the voters deviate an arbitrarily small amount from the full Bayesian rationality, which both would
solve the indifference for low taxes.
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of voters. All of the likely rich choose σˆ = yH and all of the likely poor choose the same
λ. An optimist will always vote for τ = τ as seen from (10) and (4) and noting that
r(λ) ≥ q for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. A realist will always vote for τ = τ by (5). Also, the likely
rich will always vote for τ = τ , similarly to the the optimistic likely poor. Putting all this
together, the policy outcome can be derived as a function of λ. The total share of agents
expecting above average income is q + (1− q)(1− λ). The policy outcome τ ∗ depends on
whether this share exceeds 1
2
or not:
τ ∗ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩τ if λ <
1
2(1−q)
τ if λ ≥ 1
2(1−q)
. (11)
In line with Minozzi’s (2013) model, we first let the agents vote strategically.13 That is,
they take account that their vote might be pivotal. As will be shown later, if agents voted
sincerely, the trivial outcome would be everyone maximizing the anticipatory utility. In
contrast to models of Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) and Be´nabou (2008), where voting is
sincere, here the possibility of losing income due to less redistribution is the only thing that
restricts the optimism of voters. This lets us focus on the trade-off between anticipation
and redistribution. Sincere voting is studied in section 4.3.
3.5 Conditions for the POUM Effect, τ ∈ [0, 1]
To gain some intuition and to analyze an interesting special case, we first set τ = 1 and
τ = 0. The more general and more realistic case of τ < 1 and τ > 0 is analyzed in the
next section.
Now that we know the voting decisions in period 1, we turn to the choice of λ in
period 0. Due to the discontinuity of the policy outcome, the likely poor really have only
two options to choose from. They either form optimal beliefs among those which support
high taxation or optimal beliefs among those which support low taxation. We now derive
the conditions under which the likely poor choose optimism and low taxation over realism
13Or rather we let agents form their beliefs strategically taking account how it affects the policy
outcome. Technically speaking the voting here is sincere but agents can affect their policy preferences via
their beliefs. The assumption that the policy outcome is τ in case of λ = 12(1−q) ensures that an optimal
choice of λ exists for all s > 0.
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and high taxation. In other words, we derive the conditions under which the prospects of
upward mobility of the likely poor are so high, that a low tax regime is supported.
Let λ be the optimal recall rate given λ ≥ 1
2(1−q) and λ the optimal recall rate given
λ < 1
2(1−q) . If the likely poor choose λ, the tax rate will be τ
∗ = 1. The expected utility
then is
Uλ0,i = λu0,i(yL, yL, 1) + (1− λ)u0,i(yL, yH , 1) = δsy¯ + δ2y¯. (12)
Whether they end up being optimists or realists does not matter since in both cases they
expect the redistribution to equalize all incomes. If they, on the other hand, choose λ,
the tax rate will be τ ∗ = 0. The expected utility is
Uλ0,i = λu0,i(yL, yL, 0) + (1− λ)u0,i(yL, yH , 0)
= λ[δsyL + δ
2yL] + (1− λ)
[
δs[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + δ2yL
]
. (13)
With probability λ, a likely poor agent recalls σˆi = yL and forms realistic beliefs, and
with probability 1 − λ, a likely poor agent recalls σˆi = yH and forms optimistic beliefs
weighted by the reliability of the signal. In both cases she still ends up consuming yL in
period 2.
The comparison of (12) and (13) tells us if the likely poor would rather choose high
anticipatory utility in period 1 and low taxation with low consumption in period 2 over
low anticipatory utility and high taxation with high consumption. The difference between
the utilities resulting from these two choices, which we call the incentive to optimism, can
be written as:
Uλ0,i − Uλ0,i = −δ2(y¯ − yL) + sδ[λyL + (1− λ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL]− y¯]. (14)
The first term tells what a likely poor agent loses in income and consumption if the tax
rate is τ ∗ = 0 instead of τ ∗ = 1. The second term tells what she expects to gain in
anticipatory utility if she chooses λ instead of λ. The likely poor are better off in the low
tax regime if the incentive to optimism is positive. That is, if Uλ0,i − Uλ0,i > 0 the likely
poor agents choose λ = λ.
Lemma 1 (Awareness choices of the likely poor, τ ∈ [0, 1]). When τ ∈ [0, 1], the
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likely poor choose λ = λ = 0 if
s > s∗(χ) ≡ δ q + χ(1− q)
(1− χ)(1− q) . (15)
Otherwise they choose λ = λ ∈ [ 1
2(1−q) , 1].
We have defined s∗ to be a threshold such that if s > s∗, then agents value anticipation
enough for the gain in anticipatory utility to outweigh the loss of income, and the likely
poor will be optimistic enough to vote for a low tax rate. If, on the other hand, s < s∗,
then the anticipation is not enough to compensate for the lost income and the likely poor
will remain realistic enough to vote for a high tax rate.
Lemma 2 (Politico-economic equilibria, τ ∈ [0, 1]). A politico-economic equilibrium
is a 4-tuple (yH , λ
∗, r(λ∗|χ), τ ∗).14
(i) If s > s∗, there is an equilibrium in which the likely poor choose λ∗ = λ = 0, the
likely rich choose σˆ = yH , and the policy outcome is τ
∗ = 0.
(ii) If s < s∗, there are equilibria in which the likely poor choose λ∗ = λ ∈ [ 1
2(1−q) , 1], the
likely rich choose σˆ = yH , and the policy outcome is τ
∗ = 1.
The POUM effect occurs in the equilibrium (i), so the condition for the possibility of
the POUM effect is equivalent to the condition of the equilibrium (i).
Proposition 1 (The condition for the POUM effect, τ ∈ [0, 1]). When τ ∈ [0, 1],
the condition for the POUM effect is Uλ0,i − Uλ0,i > 0 ⇐⇒ s > s∗.
The prospects of upward mobility lead to low taxes if agents value anticipatory utility
enough. How much is enough depends on the threshold s∗. The higher s∗ is, the less
likely the POUM effect is, and conversely, the lower s∗ is, the more likely we will observe
low taxation. This threshold varies with the parameters of the model. First, the POUM
effect becomes more likely with discounting. Myopic preferences put more weight on
14There is actually a third type of equilibrium, where all agents choose σˆi = yH and the policy outcome
is τ∗ = 0 even if s < s∗. There would be no unilateral incentive to deviate. This equilibrium would be
the unique equilibrium if we assumed sincere voting.
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anticipation which occurs before consumption.15 Second, the effects of changes in the
income distribution are left for section 4.1. Third, the threshold depends on the degree
of Bayesian sophistication χ, which we study more closely now.
Consider first the special case of completely naive inference. Setting χ = 0, we get
s∗(0) = δ
q
1− q . (16)
This special case corresponds to Minozzi’s (2013) model.16 If, on the other hand, we let
agents’ inference approach Bayesian rationality, we find:
lim
χ→1
s∗(χ) =∞. (17)
The threshold required for the POUM effect to occur approaches infinity as the inference of
agents approaches full Bayesian rationality. This means that with full Bayesian rationality
the importance of anticipation s can never be above s∗ and it can never be optimal for
the likely poor to form beliefs that support low taxes as the policy outcome. That is, on
contrary to the special case of Minozzi’s (2013) model, where χ = 0, if we acknowledge
that the people cannot simply choose their beliefs and let χ > 0, the threshold s∗ increases
dramatically in χ and in the extreme case of full Bayesian rationality, the POUM effect
can never occur.
Figure 2 tracks the threshold s∗ as a function of χ. To give some concreteness to the
results here, we note from the period 0 utility in (9) that if s = δ, then agents value
anticipatory utility as much as consumption. The dashed line in Figure 2, denoted by δ,
depicts this value of s. For the threshold values s∗ > δ, the anticipation of consumption
must bring more utility to the agents than the consumption itself to make the POUM
effect possible. We see that s∗ is below δ only for very small values of χ.
To see why fully Bayesian likely poor agents can never be better off with low taxes,
consider again the incentive to optimism given in (14). Plugging in the optimal recall rate
15Interestingly, in the model of Be´nabou and Ok (2001), discounting makes the POUM effect less likely.
This result in their model is, however, derived in a multiperiod setting and is not directly comparable.
16Minozzi’s model which abstracts from discounting derives δ∗ = n−mm , where δ
∗ is the threshold of the
savoring parameter, n is the (finite) number of agents, and m is the number of the likely poor.
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10 χ
s∗
δ
Figure 2: s∗ as a function of χ
λ = 0, the incentive to optimism can be written as
Uλ0,i − Uλ0,i = −δ2(y¯ − yL) + sδ[r(0|χ)− q]∆y, (18)
where ∆y ≡ yH − yL. The second term in the right hand side is the gain in anticipation
if an agent chooses λ over λ. Noting that r(0|χ)→ 1 as χ→ 0 and r(0|χ)→ q as χ→ 1,
it is easy to see how the value of the second term goes to zero as χ→ 1 and why it does
not when χ = 0. The incentive to optimism is at its maximum when χ = 0 and as agents’
inference approaches full Bayesian rationality the utility gain from anticipation vanishes.
The reliability which the agents use to weight the information of their recollection
plays a crucial role here. For χ = 1, the reliability r(λ|χ) is an increasing function of λ.
The more realistic the likely poor are, the more reliable signal σˆi = yH is. On the other
hand, when the likely poor systematically memorize and recall σˆi = yH , they know that no
matter what is their true signal, they recall σˆi = yH . In this case, the signal does not carry
any information anymore, and agents form their beliefs relying on the prior distribution,
r(0|χ) = q. However, when the degree of Bayesian sophistication decreases, the reliability
becomes less and less dependent on λ, and the optimistic poor put more and more weight
on their pleasant recollection. When χ = 0, the reliability is independent of λ and no
matter how optimistic the likely poor are, they always fully trust their recollections.
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Figure 3: ιgross(λ|χ) for different values of χ
It is instructive to see how the period-0 expectation of expected period-2 income in
period 1, and expected anticipatory utility which is proportional to the expected income,
varies with λ and χ. For this, we shortly abstract from taxation to see how the choice of
λ and the sophistication of agents’ inference interact in forming the belief about future
gross income. The expectation of expected gross income of a likely poor agent in period
1 from the point of view of period 0 as a function of λ is17
ιgross(λ|χ) ≡ E[E[yi|F1,i]|λ, χ, F0,i] = (1− λ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + λyL. (19)
This function is plotted in Figure 3 for different values of χ. The lowest curve corre-
sponds to the case χ = 1. As agents put more and more weight on signal σˆi = yH in their
period 0 strategy, that is, as they become more and more likely to remember σˆi = yH ,
the expected income approaches the average income. In the case of λ = 0, each of the
likely poor and each of the likely rich always recall signal σˆi = yH . As everyone is pooling
on the same signal, receiving this signal does not give any information, and agents rely
17See the discussion in section 3.2
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on the prior when assessing their future income. In the case of full Bayesian rationality,
it is therefore not possible for agents to achieve above average expectations. As they
expect average income in the high tax regime, they cannot possibly improve their utility
by voting for low taxes.
On the contrary, when χ < 1, agents can achieve above average expectations, and
they, therefore, can have a gain in anticipatory utility to trade off against the lost income
in the low tax regime. For agents with χ < 1, a decrease in λ does not affect the reliability
of the signal as much as it affects for the Bayesian rational agents. In the limiting case
of χ = 0, represented by the linear curve in Figure 3, the reliability is independent of λ,
and all agents can believe to be of type yH . The expectations of naive agents are not as
constrained as the expectations of Bayesian agents and the more naive the agents are, the
less constrained their beliefs are. The naive agents can, therefore, achieve higher hopes
and higher anticipatory utility than their Bayesian counterparts.
What values of χ are feasible then? Do people have the introspection to realize that
they might have a self-serving tendency to remember positive news and forget bad news
or are they always able to deceive themselves into believing what fits them best? Minozzi
(2013) justifies his assumption of full naivete by arguing that the belief formation is an
automatic and unconscious process and therefore the players cannot recall the process
itself and are therefore ignorant of it occurring. They then completely trust their recol-
lections, since they have forgotten the action of their past self or rather since they never
even knew about the action of their unconscious self. On the other hand, Be´nabou and
Tirole (2002) argues that if a person consistently memorizes good news and ignores bad
news, she will likely become aware of this tendency and will therefore not fully rely on
her recollections. So even if the belief formation is an automatic, unconscious process and
people cannot, therefore, recall it happening, they, by learning from their past mistakes,
will internalize the existence of this process and start adjusting their reliance on their
memories accordingly.
Framed in other words, the implausible consequence of assuming χ = 0 is that people
are able to choose their beliefs without them in any way depending on the objective reality.
To be clear, the beliefs supplied by a naive cognitive technology are usually restricted to
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the support of the outcome and can be further constrained to a subset of the support.18
Also, a naive cognitive technology does take the reality into account, when the beliefs
are traded against their adverse consequences. However, in principle, it does not need
to. Naive cognitive technologies are also nevertheless insensitive to the distribution of
outcomes. When χ = 0, an agent can believe to be likely rich no matter how small
the prior probability of being rich is given that this prior probability is positive. Even
if the belief formation mechanism is an automatic and unconscious process, it seems
implausible that this process does not need in any way to take account the information
that the reality inevitably provides, and that people can simply choose their beliefs.
Indeed, Kunda (1990) strongly argues that people do not seem to be completely free
to believe what they want to believe. According to him, people can bias their beliefs
only to the extent that they can justify their new beliefs. The main mechanism for the
justification of the new beliefs is a biased memory search which implies that prior beliefs
do play a role in determining the new beliefs. Also, according to evidence, changes in
beliefs seem to be constrained by pre-existing beliefs (Kunda, 1990). Therefore, a belief
formation technology with some Bayesian sophistication, which anchors the beliefs to the
prior distribution, and therefore to the reality in our model, would seem more plausible
a representation of these psychological processes than a belief formation technology with
none Bayesian sophistication.
However, assuming χ = 1 is rather extreme as well and χ ∈ (0, 1) would most likely
best reflect the reasoning of real people. Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) presents the model
in the context of people distorting their beliefs to motivate themselves when facing time
inconsistency problems. This might be a context where people get enough feedback to
learn about their unconscious information processing. In the context of the present work,
where people form beliefs about their future incomes and vote for redistribution the
feedback mechanism may not facilitate this learning. The actions taken are long-lasting,
there are not that many chances of learning, and the real-life mechanism with which
votes transform to redistributive policies is noisy and complicated. It might, therefore, be
plausible that the sophistication in the belief formation process depends on the context
and that, indeed, in the context of forming beliefs about future income, people might be
18See the footnote 2 in the appendix to Minozzi (2013).
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less sophisticated as in the context of motivating oneself in the everyday activities.
In the case of full Bayesian rationality, the wishful beliefs of the likely poor are bounded
above to the average income, which is what they expect to receive if τ ∗ = 1 as well. They
cannot, therefore, increase their anticipatory utility by distorting their beliefs. However,
what if they could not expect the incomes to be fully equalized under the high tax policy.
Then they might be able to increase their anticipatory utility by distorting their beliefs
even if they still ended up with expectations of average income. The case of τ = 1 and
τ = 0 is maybe a bit too unrealistic a simplification and we therefore turn now to the
general case of τ ∈ [τ , τ ].
3.6 Conditions for the POUM Effect, τ ∈ [τ , τ ]
The weakness of the previous setting is that if agents vote for full expropriation, they
know that their period 2 incomes will be the average income. Therefore, no matter what
they believe, they will expect average income. On the other hand, if the likely poor
choose optimism, they will lose all redistribution, which is a very high cost for optimism.
To address these problems, we now consider the general case of our model and impose
lower and upper limits on the tax rate. That is, we now set τ ∈ [τ , τ ], and require τ < τ
so that the set of tax policies is always nonempty.
If we set τ < 1, the anticipated consumption and the consumption of the likely poor
realists will now be below average in the high tax regime. This makes the high tax
equilibrium less attractive compared to the case of τ = 1. The increase in payoff when
choosing optimism over realism is therefore now greater, and the condition for the POUM
effect should become looser.
At the other extreme, a full laissez-faire policy is not a completely innocuous simpli-
fication either. The likely poor have to trade optimism against losing all redistribution.
Imposing a lower limit for redistribution makes this trade-off less drastic. If τ > 0, there
will be some taxation in the low tax regime as well, and the consequences of optimism are
less severe for the likely poor. By setting τ > 0, we make the decrease in period 2 con-
sumption of the likely poor smaller in case they choose λ over λ. Again, this should make
optimism more attractive and the POUM effect more likely. Of course, an increase in τ
decreases the anticipatory utility of the optimists, but the effect in period 2 consumption
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seems to dominate for the likely poor.
To put these effects together, by restricting the set of available tax policies, we make the
POUM effect more feasible in two ways. First, by decreasing the attractiveness of realism
by having lower taxes and, therefore, lower anticipation and consumption in the high tax
regime. Second, by increasing the attractiveness of optimism by having higher taxes in
the low tax regime and therefore higher consumption but possibly lower anticipation. The
effects on the period 2 consumption and realists’ anticipation seem to dominate the effect
on optimists’ anticipation so that the smaller is the range of allowed tax policies, the more
likely the POUM effect occurs.
As before, the apparently continuous choice reduces to a binary choice, and the likely
poor choose between λ and λ knowing that choosing the former leads to high taxation
and choosing the latter leads to low taxation. If they choose the former, the tax rate will
be τ ∗ = τ and their expected payoffs are
Uλ0,i = λu0,i(yL, yL, τ) + (1− λ)u0,i(yL, yH , τ)
= λ
[
δs[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]
]
+ (1− λ)[δs[(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]]. (20)
This differs from (12) in that the tax does not fully equalize the incomes. When all incomes
are not equalized, different expectations lead to different amounts of anticipation. This
allows the anticipatory utility of optimists and realists to diverge also in the high tax
regime. Note especially how a realist derives anticipatory utility from an expectation of
below average income.
If the likely poor agents choose the latter, the tax rate will be τ ∗ = τ and their
expected payoffs are
Uλ0,i = λu0,i(yL, yL, τ) + (1− λ)u0,i(yL, yH , τ)
= λ
[
δs[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]
]
+ (1− λ)[δs[(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]]. (21)
With probability λ, a likely poor agent ends up being a realist and anticipates low con-
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sumption. With probability 1 − λ, she ends up being an optimist and anticipates high
consumption. In both cases the period 2 consumption is low. However, in comparison to
(13), the period 2 consumption is now higher, and the consequences of optimism are now
less severe for the likely poor.
The incentive to optimism is
Uλ0,i − Uλ0,i = −δ2(τ − τ)(y¯ − yL) + δs
[
(1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)∆y + (1− τ)yL + τ y¯
]
− δs[(1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)∆y + (1− τ)yL + τ y¯]. (22)
To not clutter the page with notation, the incentive to optimism is written in a still
interpretable, but different and a more compact form than (14). The first term tells
the loss of income due to less redistribution. The second term measures the expected
anticipatory utility if the the likely poor choose λ = λ. With probability 1 − λ there
is an increase of (1 − τ)r(λ)∆y from the ”base level” of (1 − τ)yL + τ y¯ in anticipatory
utility. The third term similarly measures the expected anticipatory utility if the likely
poor choose λ = λ. If the incentive to denial is positive, the likely poor will prefer to be
optimists and choose λ = λ.
Lemma 3 (Awareness choices of the likely poor, τ ∈ [τ , τ ]). When τ ∈ [τ , τ ], the
likely poor choose λ = λ = 0 if
s > s∗∗(χ) ≡ δ(τ − τ)q
(1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q , (23)
Otherwise they choose λ = λ = 1
2(1−q) .
As before, whether the savoring parameter is above or below the threshold s∗∗, the
likely poor will either prefer high anticipation with low redistribution or low anticipation
with high redistribution. The choice of the likely poor determines the tax rate.
Lemma 4 (Politico-economic equilibria, τ ∈ [τ , τ ]). A politico-economic equilibrium
is a 4-tuple (yH , λ
∗, r(λ∗|χ), τ ∗).19
19There is actually a third type of equilibrium, where all agents choose σˆ = yH and the policy outcome
is τ = 0 even if s < s∗∗ as there would be no unilateral incentive to deviate.
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Figure 4: s∗∗ as a function of χ
(i) If s > s∗∗, there is an equilibrium in which the likely poor choose λ∗ = λ = 0, the
likely rich choose σˆ = yH , and the policy outcome is τ
∗ = τ .
(ii) If s < s∗∗, there is an equilibrium in which the likely poor choose λ∗ = λ = 1
2(1−q) ,
the likely rich choose σˆ = yH , and the policy outcome is τ
∗ = τ .
As before, the POUM effect occurs in the equilibrium (i) and the conditions for the
POUM effect are the same as the conditions for this equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (The condition for the POUM effect, τ ∈ [τ , τ ]). The condition for
the POUM effect is Uλ0,i − Uλ0,i > 0 ⇐⇒ s > s∗∗.
Interestingly, s∗∗ is now finite for all χ ∈ [0, 1]. In contrast to the setting in the
previous section, the POUM effect becomes possible even if the agents are fully Bayesian
information processors. Figure 4 depicts s∗∗ as a function of χ. We see that the threshold
s∗∗ does not increase in χ as explosively as s∗ does. As before, to ease the interpretation,
the dashed line depicts the values of s for which the agents derive as much utility from
the anticipation of consumption as from consumption itself. The parameter values for
the allowed tax policies used in Figure 4 are τ = 0.25 and τ = 0.45, and they represent
roughly the total tax revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product in US and
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in Nordic Countries and, respectively (OECD, 2008).20 These values and countries are
chosen to represent the extremes of taxation among the developed countries and serve
only as an example. The hypothetical extremes of tax policies are probably larger than
currently existing extremes. As we will see, the bounds of allowed tax policies have a
clear effect on s∗∗.
The following proposition makes formal the effect of parameter χ which can be seen
in Figure 4.
Proposition 3 (Effect of change in the degree of Bayesian sophistication). The
partial derivative of s∗∗ with respect to χ is positive, that is, ∂s
∗∗
∂χ
> 0 for all parameter
values. The more sophisticated the cognitive technology is, the less likely is the POUM
effect.
Even if the POUM effect is now possible for all χ ∈ [0, 1], it can still be questioned
whether it is feasible for all χ ∈ [0, 1]. Again, the agents may have to value anticipation
more than consumption to prefer low taxes if the range of the feasible tax rates is big
enough. To see this, consider the threshold value s∗∗ when χ = 1:
s∗∗(1) = δ
(τ − τ)(1− q)
(1− τ)q . (24)
Now s∗∗ > δ, for all pairs (τ , τ), such that τ > (1− q)τ + q. We could argue that within
a jurisdiction, the range of feasible tax rates is small enough and hence, the POUM
effect is feasible also for a sophisticated cognitive technology. On the other hand, as
discussed, fully Bayesian sophistication may not be the correct specification in the belief
distortion technology to represent people’s beliefs about their future incomes and their
voting behavior. Certainly, the set of values of χ for which the POUM effect is feasible
has now increased in comparison to the case in the previous section.
To understand how the likelihood of the POUM effect depends on the maximum and
minimum taxes, consider first what happens when we set an upper limit on the tax rate.
The upper limit of the tax is relevant when the likely poor choose λ = λ since then the
resulting policy is high taxes. Imposing a restriction on how much of the income can be
redistributed we make the prospects of choosing λ = λ worse. Consider the effects on the
20q = 0.3 and δ is normalized to 1. Note that the curve is independent of the values of yL and yH .
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period 2 consumption and period 1 anticipatory utility separately. First, a decrease in the
upper limit of the tax rate decreases the period 2 consumption of the likely poor in the
high tax regime, which makes voting for high taxes less rewarding. Second, for those of
the likely poor who end up being realists, the lower consumption in period 2 implies lower
anticipation in period 1. Those of the likely poor who end up being optimists will expect
above-average incomes, and they will, therefore, gain in anticipatory utility as the upper
limit of the tax decreases. However, it can be shown that this latter effect is dominated
and the effect on ex-ante expected anticipation stays negative.21 That is, when imposing
an upper limit for the tax rate, both anticipation and consumption prospects of choosing
λ = λ deteriorate. Proposition 4 formalizes this total effect of the upper limit of the tax
rate.
Proposition 4 (Effect of upper limit of tax rate on the conditions for POUM).
The partial derivative of s∗∗ with respect to τ is positive, that is, ∂s
∗∗
∂τ
> 0 for all parameter
values. The POUM effect becomes more likely as τ decreases.
The prospects of choosing λ = λ, on the other hand, are now better. The likely poor
choosing λ = λ leads to low taxes, so here the lower limit of the tax rate is interesting.
Again, there is an effect on the period 2 consumption and on the period 1 anticipation.
First, even if the likely poor vote for low taxation, redistribution does not vanish alto-
gether. Since they are trading their optimism against redistribution, the cost of optimism
is now lower. The reduction in their period 2 consumption is not as big as with the possi-
bility of complete laissez-laire. This makes choosing high anticipation and low taxes more
attractive. Second, when choosing λ = λ, all of the likely poor end up being optimists.
If they then anticipate above average income, that is, if χ < 1, then an increase in the
lower limit of the tax rate will decrease their anticipatory utility. The less sophisticated
the agents are, the more they expect to earn, and the higher is the decrease in their
anticipation. The effect on anticipatory utility is opposite to the effect on consumption.
The effect on consumption, however, seems to dominate. Proposition 5 formalizes this.
Proposition 5 (Effect of lower limit of tax rate on the conditions for POUM).
The partial derivative of s∗∗ with respect to τ is negative, that is, ∂s
∗∗
∂τ
< 0 for all parameter
21 ∂
∂τ ιnet(λ, τ) = [q − (1− λ)r(λ)]∆y > 0, where ιnet(·) is defined below.
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values. The POUM effect becomes more likely as τ increases.
To summarize these effects, the utility from choosing λ = λ decreases when we impose
the upper limit for the tax rate and the utility from choosing λ = λ increases with the
lower limit. This means that the utility cap between choosing λ = λ and λ = λ increases
as the range of allowed tax policies decreases. This utility cap is, by definition, the
incentive to optimism. Increase in the incentive to optimism then leads to less stringent
conditions for the POUM effect.
To gain further intuition on the conditions for the POUM effect, write s∗∗ as
s∗∗ =
δ(τ − τ)(y¯ − yL)
ιnet(λ, τ)− ιnet(λ, τ)
(25)
where
ιnet(λ, τ) ≡ λ[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + (1− λ)[(1− τ)(r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL) + τ y¯] (26)
is the ex ante expectation of the expected consumption of the likely poor in period 1 given
the choice of λ and the resulting tax policy τ , and where λ = 0, and λ = 1
2(1−q) .
22 The
nominator of (25) represents the difference in period 2 consumptions in the two different
tax regimes. Clearly, when τ decreases or τ increases, this difference becomes smaller.
As discussed, when this difference becomes smaller the loss in the period 2 consumption
when choosing λ = λ over λ = λ decreases. If the nominator decreases, s∗∗ decreases
proportionally and the POUM effect becomes more likely. The denominator of (25) is
proportional to the difference in expected anticipatory utility of the likely poor between
their choices of low or high recall rate. When this difference increases, the likely poor
have more to gain in anticipation and belief distortion becomes more attractive. If the
denominator increases, s∗∗ decreases and the POUM effect becomes more likely.
In choosing their awareness rate, the likely poor agents make a trade-off between
anticipatory utility and consumption. Imposing the limits on possible tax rates, we alter
this trade-off such that they have less to lose in consumption. The stakes of wrong
22From this expression it is simple to derive Minozzi’s (2013) result in another form. By setting τ = 0,
τ = 1, δ = 1, and χ = 0, we get s∗∗ = y¯−yLyH−y¯ . Minozzi’s (2013) condition for the POUM effect is
δ > δ∗ = y¯−ypyr−y¯ , where yp is the income of the likely poor, yr income of the likely rich, and δ
∗ the
threshold in the savoring parameter δ.
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decisions due to biased beliefs are now smaller, and optimism is, therefore, more attractive.
4 Further Analysis
4.1 Effects of Changes in Income Distribution
As already seen, given the value that agents put on anticipation s, the threshold s∗∗
determines whether the POUM effect occurs. The comparative statistics of s∗∗, therefore,
reveal how the conditions for the POUM effect vary as the parameters of the model
change. In this section we consider the effects of changes in yL, yH , y¯, and q.
Following Minozzi’s (2013) analysis, we first study the changes in yL and yH holding
the average income constant. Proposition 6 collects these results.
Proposition 6 (Effects of changes in yL and yH holding y¯ constant). Holding the
average income constant, the threshold s∗∗ decreases in yL and yH , that is, the POUM
effect becomes more feasible when yL or yH increase.
23
If the incomes of the likely rich increase such that the average income stays constant,
the conditions for the POUM effect become looser. Similarly, if the incomes of the likely
poor increase such that the average income stays constant, the conditions for the POUM
effect become again looser. Why we insist on holding the average income constant is that
it makes the effects interesting. The average income y¯ is a function of both yL and yH and
taking this into account gives us ∂s
∗∗
∂yH
= ∂s
∗∗
∂yL
= 0 as can easily be seen by noting that s∗∗
in (23) is independent of both yH and yL. So by letting the average income adapt to the
changes in the incomes of the likely poor or the likely rich, the condition for the POUM
effect would not change.
Holding the average income constant might feel artificial, but looking at the incentive
to optimism given in (22) gives us an idea, what does the partial derivatives holding the
average income constant mean here.24 For the agents, changes in the average income mean
changes in the transfers they receive, whereas changes in either yL or yH mean changes in
the expectations of their pre-tax income. That is, holding average income constant means
23These effects are the same for s∗
24Unfortunately, Minozzi (2013) does not justify this choice in his comparative analysis.
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holding the tax revenue and transfers constant, whereas increases in the high and low
levels of income mean increased expectations of gross income. Increased prospects of gross
income, when the transfers are expected to stagnate make optimism more rewarding. This
kind of change in the income distribution could occur, for instance, if the tax is regressive
such that the increase in the incomes of the likely rich does not lead to a proportional
increase in the tax revenue. We could also interpret the income levels yL and yH more
loosely as what the likely poor perceive these income levels to be. The perceived income of
the likely rich could change without affecting the tax revenue, for instance, if the incomes
in other jurisdictions change and the likely poor observe this or if the consumption habits
of the likely rich change towards more conspicuous consumption. ”In 1972, a storm of
protests from blue-collar workers greeted Senator McGovern’s proposal for confiscatory
estate taxes. They apparently wanted some big prizes maintained in the game. The silent
majority did not want the yacht clubs closed forever to their children and grandchildren
while those who had already become members kept sailing along.” writes Okun (2015,
page 47).
Similarly, the change in the average income has no effect as such, ∂s
∗∗
∂y¯
= 0, but holding
yL and yH constant and letting y¯ change gives us
Proposition 7 (Effect of change in y¯ holding yL and yH constant). Holding yL
and yH constant, the threshold s
∗∗ increases in y¯, that is, the POUM effect becomes less
feasible when the average income increases.
The case of holding yL and yH constant and letting y¯ change mirrors the previous
discussion. If the likely poor expect increased transfers but the prospects of gross income
stay the same, then realism becomes more attractive.
The changes in the fraction of the likely rich produce slightly more complicated effects
mainly because the reliability is a function of q, and the optimal recall rate λ varies with q.
We therefore only characterize the effects. Consider a change in the income distribution
where the proportion of the likely rich becomes smaller. A decrease in q has three effects.
First, it decreases the average income and the tax revenue and, therefore, makes realism
less attractive. Second, it decreases λ, the optimal choice if the likely poor opt for high
taxes. When there are fewer likely rich agents voting for low taxes, it allows the likely
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poor to be more optimistic even if they opt for high redistribution. This makes realism
more attractive. Third, as q and, hence, λ decrease, they both contribute to decreasing
the reliability of the signal σˆi = yH and, therefore, make the anticipated income lower
and optimism less attractive.
All effects that work via the reliability of recalled signal depend crucially on χ. Hence,
for low values of χ, the reliability does not depend that much on the prior distribution
or λ and the first effect dominates. In this case, POUM effect becomes more likely as
the prospects of choosing λ = λ are now worse. For high values of χ, the reliability is
highly dependent on the prior and λ and the second and third effect dominate. In this
case, a decrease in q makes POUM less likely. For intermediate values of χ, the relative
dominance of these effects varies, and the total effect is nonmonotonic.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
In the simple model of the current paper, utilities are linear in period 2 consumption
meaning that the aggregate utility is not sensitive to the distribution of consumption.
Therefore, the aggregate utility is trivially maximized by maximizing the anticipation, no
matter what the distribution of the consumption ends up being. Hence, the aggregate
utility as a measure of welfare is not very informative. This section, therefore, after a
brief discussion on the distribution and the aggregation of consumption and anticipation
focuses on the welfare of the likely poor and the likely rich separately.
The utility of each agent in the economy consists of two components: the utility from
anticipation and the utility from consumption. Thanks to the additivity of these utilities,
we can study the aggregate levels of these two components separately. Furthermore, as
the utilities with respect to consumption and anticipation are both linear, we say that
the welfare consists of aggregate consumption and aggregate anticipation.
As the redistribution does not produce any wastage, the aggregate consumption stays
constant at the average consumption throughout the analysis. Due to the linearity of util-
ity with respect to consumption, the average utility derived from consumption remains
constant as well. Only the distribution of the consumption and the utility from consump-
tion between the likely poor and the likely rich varies depending on the chosen tax policy.
The higher is the tax rate, the more equally the aggregate consumption is distributed
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among the likely rich and the likely poor.
The more novel component of welfare is the aggregate anticipation, which is the sum
of anticipation of those agents who recalled σˆi = yL and of those who recalled σˆi = yH .
A fraction (1− q)λ of agents recalls σˆi = yL and they anticipate a gross income of yL. A
fraction q + (1 − q)(1 − λ) of agents recalls σˆi = yH and the anticipate a gross income
of r(λ)yH + (1 − r(λ))yL. Note especially that those who truly belong to the likely rich
anticipate the same gross income as those of the likely poor who recall signal σˆi = yH .
The aggregate anticipatory utility derived from the anticipation of gross income is
(1− q)λsyL + [(1− q)(1− λ) + q]s[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL]. (27)
The aggregate anticipation depends on the constraints of the cognitive technology and
the awareness choices of the likely poor. For χ = 1, the aggregate anticipatory utility is
constant at sy¯. Bayesian rationality imposes a constraint on beliefs such that on average,
agents expect average income. Therefore, for the special case of χ = 1, the aggregate
anticipation is similar to the aggregate consumption in the sense that only the distribution
of the anticipation varies. As the Bayesian constraint is relaxed and values of χ < 1 are
allowed, the aggregate anticipation can exceed the anticipation of average income, and
it is no more independent of λ. In this case, the aggregate anticipation is maximized at
λ = 0.
The counterintuitive consequence of the assessment of the reliability of recollections
is that for all χ > 0, the likely rich will underestimate their future income. If all of the
likely poor choose to memorize the signal σˆi = yH , then all agents, the likely rich and
the likely poor, will recall this signal in period 1. When the likely rich are assessing the
reliability of their recollection, they know that no matter which signal an agent receives
in period 0, they will recall σˆi = yH . In the case of full Bayesian rationality, this means
that the signal is uninformative and the likely rich use the prior to form their expectations
and, therefore, underestimate their future income.25 If, on the other hand, the likely poor
25Interestingly, Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2012) find evidence, that in addition to the poor
overestimating their position in the income distribution, the rich tend to underestimate theirs. However,
their proposed mechanism is different: Agents estimate the overall income distribution by extrapolating
from the incomes of their reference group. If the reference group does not well represent the overall income
distribution, the estimates will be biased. Also, underconfidence is a well-documented phenomenon in
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choose to memorize the signal they received, then the likely rich, after recalling σˆi = yH
know that the only way to recall this signal is to be likely rich. In this case, they put a
reliability of 1 to their recollection and form accurate expectations.
This dependence of the anticipation of the rich on the awareness choice of the likely
poor can be thought of as a negative externality. As λ decreases, the likely poor are
more and more optimistic and the likely rich more and more pessimistic. When the
likely poor engage in optimism, they redistribute anticipation. If χ = 1, and the likely
poor choose λ = 0, they equalize all anticipation. In this case, the average anticipation
is constant, and the gain in anticipatory utility of the likely poor is exactly offset by
the loss in the anticipatory utility of the likely rich. The strength of externality and
the redistributive effect increases in χ. For completely naive agents, the reliability of
recollection is independent of λ, and there is no externality.
This externality should, however, not be thought of as a causal relationship between
the cognitive processes of different agents, but as an externality across information states,
as Be´nabou and Tirole (2002, page 907) put it. The likely rich do not underestimate their
prospects because the likely poor overestimate theirs, but because they know that had
they themselves been likely poor, they might still have memorized the signal σˆi = yH .
The negative externality for the likely rich is, therefore, caused by their own information
processing strategy, that is, by their own hypothetical action in an alternative history.
If the likely poor choose the low tax equilibrium with high expectations, they are
obviously better off in this equilibrium. The pessimism of the rich, however, raises the
rather surprising question of whether the likely rich are worse or better off in the low tax
equilibrium. In the standard case, where the agents do not derive utility from anticipation,
the rich have higher consumption when paying low taxes and are obviously better off in
the low tax equilibrium. When we take the anticipation into the analysis, the rich still
have higher period 2 consumption in the low tax equilibrium, but the negative externality
due to the optimism of the poor in this equilibrium erodes their anticipation in period 1.
We now see, which of these effects dominates.
In the low tax equilibrium, the utility of the likely rich from the viewpoint of period
the literature of psychology and tends to concern those with the best prospects. See, for instance, Moore
and Healy (2008).
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0 is
u0,i(yH , yH , τ) = δs [(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ)yL] + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yH + τ y¯], (28)
and in the high tax equilibrium the utility of the likely rich is
u0,i(yH , yH , τ) = δs
[
(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ)yL] + τ y¯
]
+ δ2[(1− τ)yH + τ y¯]. (29)
Again, whether the anticipation effect dominates depends on the importance of anticipa-
tion. The likely poor choosing optimism and low taxes makes the likely rich worse off if
(29) is greater than (28). If (1 − τ)r(λ) − (1 − τ)r(λ) − (τ − τ)q > 0, the condition for
this reads:
s <
−δ(τ − τ)(1− q)
(1− τ)r(λ)− (1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q . (30)
Since the denominator is positive and the nominator negative, the right-hand side of (30)
is negative. As s ≥ 0, the condition is never satisfied, and the likely rich are always better
off in the low tax equilibrium. If, on the other hand, (1−τ)r(λ)−(1−τ)r(λ)−(τ−τ)q < 0,
the condition for the likely rich to be worse off in the low tax equilibrium reads:
s >
δ(τ − τ)(1− q)
(τ − τ)q + (1− τ)r(λ)− (1− τ)r(λ) ≡ s
∗∗∗(χ). (31)
Obviously, whether the likely rich are worse off in the low tax equilibrium is an inter-
esting question only when the low tax equilibrium is possible. Figure 5 depicts s∗∗ and
s∗∗∗ as a function of χ. As we have seen, the low tax equilibrium occurs if s > s∗∗. By
definition of s∗∗∗, the rich are worse off in the low tax equilibrium if s > s∗∗∗. For χ = 1
the thresholds s∗∗ and s∗∗∗ coincide. Therefore, only for the fully Bayesian agents the
optimism of the likely poor necessarily makes the rich worse off. For χ < 1 this is not
necessarily the case.
Proposition 8 (The welfare of the likely rich). Whether the likely rich are worse off
in the low tax equilibrium depends on the degree of the Bayesian sophistication and the
value of anticipation.
(i) For χ = 1, the likely rich are worse off in the low tax equilibrium than in the high
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Figure 5: s∗∗ and s∗∗∗ as a function of χ
tax equilibrium.
(ii) For χ < 1, the likely rich are worse off in the low tax equilibrium only if s > s∗∗∗.
In Figure 5, below the lower curve, the POUM effect does not occur. Between the two
curves, the POUM effect occurs and it makes the likely rich better off. Above the upper
curve, the POUM effect occurs, and it makes the likely rich worse off.
Interestingly, an implication of the model is that fully Bayesian likely rich are worse
off with low taxes if the value of anticipation is high enough for likely poor to choose
optimism and low taxes. Again, however, completely sophisticated cognitive technology
might be only theoretical interest. The threshold value s∗∗∗ goes up fairly rapidly for
χ < 1, which makes this result less relevant.
4.3 Sincere Voting
The beliefs are most likely to be distorted by desires if the individual cost of holding
biased beliefs is small, as is the case in voting if the probability of being pivotal is very
small (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2016). An alternative assumption about the voting behavior
of agents is that they do not consider themselves to be pivotal in the determination of the
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tax policy and, therefore, form their beliefs without taking account how it affects their
policy preferences and voting.
In the model of the current work, agents trade their optimism against redistribution. If
we let the agents ignore this trade-off by assuming sincere voting, the only thing restricting
the optimism of agents are the constraints of the cognitive technology. Therefore, taking
τ ∗ as given, the dominating action for the likely poor is to choose λ = 0 for all s > 0: The
lower λ they choose, the higher anticipatory utility they can expect. The loss of income
and consumption in period 2 due to less redistribution does not enter the trade-off since
the agents do not think they can in any way influence the policy outcome. In the unique
equilibrium all agents recall σˆ = yH , they expect at least average income, and the tax
policy is τ ∗ = τ . This is curiously the equilibrium even if the likely poor do not value
anticipation very much and are worse off in the equilibrium than if they had all been
realists and voted for high taxes.
Interestingly, another way to motivate sincere voting is to derive it as a limiting case of
our benchmark model. When the range of the feasible tax rates goes to zero, the threshold
s∗∗ goes to zero as well: τ − τ = 0 implies s∗∗(χ) = 0, and choosing λ = λ over λ = λ is
optimal for all s > 0. When the upper and lower bounds of the tax policy coincide, the
likely poor cannot affect the tax rate by voting, and it is optimal for them to indulge in
optimism.
For the clarity of exposition, we consider the case τ ∈ [0, 1].26 The likely poor take τ
as given and choose λ to maximize
U0,i(λ) ≡ λu0,i(yL, yL, τ) + (1− λ)u0,i(yL, yH , τ)
= (1− λ) [δs[(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]]
+ λ
[
(δs+ δ2)[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]
]
. (32)
The best response independently of the choices of others is λ = 0. This implies an
equilibrium tax rate of τ ∗ = 0.
Proposition 9 (Politico-economic equilibrium, sincere voting). If the likely poor
do not condition their belief and voting choices on the tax policy, then, for all s > 0, there
26The case τ ∈ [τ , τ ] is similar.
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is a unique equilibrium, where λ∗ = 0, the likely rich recall σˆi = yH , and τ ∗ = 0.
The utility of a representative likely poor agent is
U0,i(0) = δs[r(0)yH + (1− r(0))yL] + δ2yL, (33)
whereas if the likely poor would have coordinated choosing λ ∈ [ 1
2(1−q) , 1], a representative
likely poor agent would have enjoyed utility
U0,i(λ) = δsy¯ + δ
2y¯ ∀λ ∈ [ 1
2(1− q) , 1]. (34)
From Lemma 1, we know that if s < s∗, (34) is greater than (33).
Proposition 10 (Welfare of the likely poor). If s < s∗, the likely poor are worse off
in the low tax equilibrium, than if they had coordinated on voting for high taxes.
A free-riding problem emerges among the likely poor: for each, it is individually
rational to indulge in optimism, but with coordinated actions they could increase their
payoffs. This case is similar to the public goods game, where the individually rational
agents do not contribute even if they would all be better off by contributing. Here the
public good is the redistribution, and the cost of contribution is lower anticipatory utility.
However, the likely poor coordinating on realism to support high taxes is not necessarily a
Pareto improvement when considering the whole electorate, as providing a public good in
a public good game is. As seen in section 4.2, the likely rich are worse off in the high tax
equilibrium if s < s∗∗∗ and χ < 1. However, if χ = 1, then unique equilibrium is Pareto-
inferior and the likely poor coordinating on realism would be a Pareto improvement.
In contrast to the case of strategic belief formation, which admittedly is a strong
requirement on the behavior of the voters, sincere voting always leads to the POUM
effect. When the likely poor do not think that their own beliefs will influence the policy
outcome, they maximize their utility by maximizing their optimism.
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5 The General Cognitive Technology
5.1 Motivations
To clearly see the connection between naive and sophisticated cognitive technologies of
belief distortion, this section presents a general version of the cognitive technology used
in the current work. It is shown how the ostensibly different cognitive technologies are
special cases of this general model and how the models in Be´nabou and Tirole (2002,
2006), Be´nabou (2008, 2013) and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) relate to other models
of biased endogenous beliefs in the literature, such as to the Endogenous Beliefs Model
(EBM) in Minozzi (2013) and to the classic reference in biased beliefs by Akerlof and
Dickens (1984).
The challenge in bringing these various models together is that in the sophisticated
cognitive technologies of the literature, Nature’s signal is binary and the action space of
Self 0 is the mixed strategies over the two signals, whereas in the naive cognitive technolo-
gies signal set is larger or even continuous and mixed strategies are not considered. Also,
in the models of a naive cognitive technology, the equilibrium can be characterized using
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, whereas the models with a sophisticated cognitive technol-
ogy rely on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In addition, especially the EBM of Minozzi
(2013) is defined for games with perfect information and chance moves to facilitate the
use of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and backward induction as a solution concept. Since
a game with uncertainty and perfect information may be confusing, in the presentation of
the general cognitive technology here, we stick to the convention of letting Nature move
first and only once and depart from this convention only when deriving the EBM from
the general model.
The general cognitive technology presented here is adapted from Be´nabou and Tirole
(2002), where the supply of distorted beliefs is modeled as a two-player dynamic game of
incomplete information within each agent. The model of Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) is
generalized by letting the signal set be arbitrarily large, but discrete.27 From this general
model, we then see that the only important difference between naive and sophisticated
27Applications of naive cognitive technologies usually have continuous signal sets, but since the formal-
ization of EBM in Minozzi (2013) is finite, we stick to finite games as well.
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cognitive technologies is the degree of Bayesian sophistication parametrized by χ.
To simplify the exposition and to focus on the differences between naive and sophis-
ticated cognitive technologies we assume that memory repression or rehearsal is costless
throughout the analysis. That is, agents do not incur any costs when memorizing and
forgetting signals and the only costs of belief distortion are in the form of nonoptimal de-
cisions. This assumption is also reasonable since memory repression costs, while proposed
as a possible extension in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), are otherwise absent in the
naive cognitive technologies of the literature. In the language of game theory, signaling is
costless, and the resulting game could be characterized as a cheap talk game.
The second motivation for the presentation of the cognitive technology in the form
here is to emphasize its portability. In a setting where an economy and interactions of
agents can be modeled as a game of imperfect or incomplete information, the actual game
can be extended to include a pre-game, where the beliefs that players hold in the actual
game are determined. Hence, whenever a game has imperfect or incomplete information
and incentives to hold biased beliefs, there is potentially a role for belief distortion. The
cognitive technology is presented here such that it is flexible enough to be used in different
settings involving uncertainty and beliefs. Hence, this chapter aims to show how to extend
any game to study whether the possible belief distortion has interesting consequences for
the outcomes of the game.
As a third motivation, this section provides the game theoretical structure of the
POUM model proposed in the present work and shows in a more detailed way how this
model relates to the POUM model proposed in Minozzi (2013).
A complete model of endogenous belief distortion consists of supply of distorted beliefs
which answers to the question of how the agents can bias their beliefs, and demand for
distorted beliefs which answers to the question of why the agents would bias their beliefs.
The aim of the current chapter is to focus on the supply of distorted beliefs, but for
completeness, in the next section, we shortly discuss the demand for distorted beliefs.
5.2 Incentives to Bias Beliefs
In a framework where the belief distortion arises endogenously from the optimal actions
of agents, the mere possibility to bias beliefs is not enough for an interesting model. Con-
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ventionally, an agent is always weakly better off when having more accurate information.
The agent cannot be worse off since information can always be ignored, but the more
accurate information can help the agent to evaluate the expected consequences of her
actions better. Obviously then, holding distorted beliefs can expose the agent to costly
mistakes in maximizing the expected utility. Even if we suppose that agents can choose
the beliefs they hold, that is, if we suppose that the supply of distorted beliefs exists, the
utility maximizing agent will choose to hold the beliefs that most closely correspond to
the objective reality if there is no incentive to bias beliefs. However, in addition to the ac-
curacy goals in reasoning, the literature in psychology has demonstrated that directional
goals are important as well (Kunda, 1990). These directional goals refer to other uses
of beliefs in addition to their informational value and suggest that beliefs have value to
people beyond to that of being a weighting function in the computation of the expected
utility. The literature on motivated beliefs uses this insight from psychology to motivate
agents to form biased beliefs by building various incentives to for biased beliefs into their
utility functions.
One such incentive is given by the affective or consumption value of the beliefs. Here
we can make a distinction between beliefs that as such please us such as believing in
the predictability and safety of our surroundings, and anticipatory emotions which we
feel when expecting the consequences of our actions and which have been extensively
discussed above (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2016, page 143).
Beliefs might also have instrumental or functional value, for instance, if agents find it
useful to distort their beliefs when facing time inconsistency problems. Smokers trying
to control their smoking might want their future selves to believe smoking to be dan-
gerous and to choose accordingly (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000) or people suffering from
insufficient motivation when exerting effort might use rosy views about the future pay-
offs to motivate themselves (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002, 2006). Generally, an agent who
suffers from time inconsistency problems could use her beliefs as a commitment device.
By manipulating the beliefs of her future incarnations, she has some control over their
decisions.
Distorted beliefs work as a commitment device in crisis bargaining game of Minozzi
(2013) as well. Parties can improve their positions in the bargaining by optimistically
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believing that they will be victorious in the conflict that results if the bargaining leads to
failure. The beliefs are common knowledge and affect the maximum levels of willingness
to pay to avoid conflict and, therefore, to the division of surplus. Even if the players
think that the beliefs of their opponents are biased, they know that their opponents will
nevertheless act according to these beliefs.
Over-confidence about own abilities might reduce the signaling cost when an agent tries
to convince others of her good qualities (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2002, page 877; Schward-
mann and van der Weele, 2016). Trivers (2011) proposes that this signaling value of
beliefs is the primary reason for self-deception: We deceive ourselves mainly in order to
deceive others.
5.3 Multiple Selves and Imperfect Recall
Modeling agents consisting of multiple selves has become a standard tool in understand-
ing inconsistent behaviors. Most notably, time inconsistencies and self-control problems
indicate that people have conflicting preferences in different points of time. This can be
modeled by letting agents have multiple temporal selves with different preferences, as, for
instance, in Strotz (1956), Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999). Jamison and Wegener (2009) go even further by proposing, that mul-
tiple selves need not only be viewed as a modeling device, but people seem to actually
use the same brain systems to think about themselves in the future as they use to think
about other people.
In contrary to changes in preferences, changes in beliefs and information do not neces-
sarily lead to such inconsistencies that would require the use of the multiple-self approach.
Learning and updating beliefs can be modeled without multiple selves. However, in ad-
dition to acquiring information people sometimes lose information as well. Forgetting is
not something a rational agent would do, and modeling forgetting has not been common
in economics since Selten (1975) rejected models with imperfect recall as misspecified.
Modeling forgetting while preserving perfect recall can, however, be done with multiple
selves. Letting the selves be distinct players and giving them different information, we can
model the beliefs and information of agent as a game of incomplete information between
her temporal selves. This implies that the agent can have imperfect recall and can forget,
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but the analysis of the model proceeds at the level of her temporal selves which allows us
to use the standard tools of game theory, including perfect recall.
For the purposes of this chapter, we have to specify two forms of imperfect recall.
First, forgetting, that is, an information set containing histories that are incompatible
with previously held information, is one way to violate perfect recall. The other way
relevant here is imperfect inference. A player may remember her past information sets,
but still fail to use this information to consistently infer in which element of her current
information set she is acting (Rubinstein and Piccione, 1997, page 6). All the cognitive
technologies with χ < 1 violate perfect recall since the beliefs are not updated using Bayes
rule. In our analysis, we use the multiple-self approach to circumvent the first type of
imperfect recall but the second form of imperfect recall will be present whenever χ < 1.
5.4 The Cognitive Technology
5.4.1 Players
The economy consists of a set N of agents. The conventional concrete actions of agents
in this economy are captured by a general game Γ, where there is uncertainty over the
outcomes. Naturally, this uncertainty induces agents to form beliefs so that they can
compare the expected payoffs of their actions. We extend this game by embedding it
as a continuation game to a pre-game of intrapersonal strategic communication, which
crucially changes the belief formation process and allows biased beliefs in Γ.
To do this, we model each agent as two players. Using the language of Be´nabou and
Tirole (2002), we call these players Self 0 and Self 1 of an agent. Self 1s actions are
the conventional concrete actions that are available to agents in game Γ. Self 0s act in
the pre-game and their actions are the more subtle cognitive processes that affect the
information of Self 1s. To fix vocabulary, we call players all those entities in the economy
that make decisions, that is, Self 0s and Self 1s of all agents. Each agent, on the other
hand, consists of two players, Self 0 and Self 1 of that agent.28 Agents are the entities we
would observe acting in the economy. If the total number of agents is |N |, then the total
28The EBM model in Minozzi (2013) calls these the player and the belief-forming agent of the player.
Multiple-self approach also parallels with Selten’s (1975) agent-normal form where each information set
is given an agent that represents the player to whom the information set belongs and who has the same
payoffs as this player. We reserve the word player to refer to a rational decision maker in a game.
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Figure 6: Timeline
number of players is 2|N |. Giving different names to the temporal selves of agents clarifies
the approach taken here, where each agent is modeled as two separate players, and both
of the players have perfect recall in the sense of remembering all their past actions and
their past information. An agent can, however, forget her past actions, since Self 1 may
have less information than Self 0. Nevertheless, as will become clear, we allow Self 1s to
have imperfect recall in the sense of non-standard inference.
Agents interact with other agents in an economy where their payoffs are potentially
interconnected. Therefore, the selves of the agents act strategically taking account the
actions of not only the other self of the same agent but also the selves of all other agents.
All these interactions are captured by a dynamic game of imperfect information.
5.4.2 Pre-Game
A crucial component of a model of beliefs is some uncertainty over the outcomes giving
room for the formation of beliefs. Here this uncertainty is in the form of a random variable
θi ∈ Θi on whose realization the utility of agent i depends. We call this random variable
θi the type of agent i. Θi is the set of possible types of agent i. As usual, incomplete
information is modeled as imperfect information, and a player called Nature determines
the realizations of random variables.
We grant the first move to Nature. Nature chooses the state of the world by drawing
a vector of types θ from a joint probability distribution of types G(θ). The support of
this distribution and the set of possible states of the world is Ω = ×i∈NΘi. None of the
players observe the realization of the state of the world directly. Instead, for all i, Self 0
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of agent i receives a signal determined by a signal function σi : Ω ↦→ Σi, which maps the
set of states of the world to the signal set Σi.
29 The signal set is a subset of the set of all
possible subsets of the set of states of the world, Σi ⊂ P(Ω), where P denotes power set.
Self 1s do not observe the signal.30 In general, the signals are noisy, and Self 0s do not
get to know the exact state of the world, but a set of the states of the world of which the
realized state of the world is an element. Their information after receiving the signal is
the prior distribution conditioned on the received signal. Let G(θ|σi) = F0,i ∈ F0,i, where
F0,i is the set of all possible beliefs about θ Self 0 of agent i can end up with. Given the
prior distribution G(θ), the form of the signal function σi determines F0,i. Self 0 of agent
i, given a signal, updates her beliefs using the Bayes rule. That the Self 0 rationally uses
all the available information, represents the idea that the objective reality plays a role in
the belief formation process. By knowing the true signal, Self 1 knows the consequences
of biased beliefs and can, therefore, address the trade-off between the benefits of distorted
beliefs and the costs of inaccurate information.
Self 1 of agent i does not observe the signal σi, but she might get information about
the state of the world by recalling (receiving) a signal σˆi, which Self 0 has memorized
(sent). The action of Self 0 is to choose which signal Self 1 will recall. Let σˆi denote a
pure action of Self 0 of agent i. The set of pure actions of Self 0 is the same as her signal
set. In general, Self 0 of agent i plays a mixed strategy φi, which assigns a probability
distribution over Σi for each possibly received signal. Let the set of mixed strategies
available to agent i be Φi. The probabilities assigned to each possible signal to Self 1 can
be interpreted as recall or awareness rates. The memory of an agent is probabilistic: If
the Self 0 receives the signal σi, the probability of remembering signal σˆi
′ is φi(σˆi
′|σi). Let
σ = (σi)i∈N and σˆ = (σˆi)i∈N be the profiles of signals Self 0s receive and signals the Self
1s recall, respectively, and let φ = (φi)i∈N be the profile of Self 0s’ strategies.
5.4.3 Continuation Game
We now describe a general game of imperfect information and show how biased beliefs can
be modeled in it by embedding the general game as a continuation game for the pre-game
29The signal function here corresponds to the definition of partitional information function in Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994, page 68).
30More formally, we could define separate uninformative constant signal functions to Self 1s.
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described in the previous section. This general game can describe any interesting setting
where there is some incentive for agents to hold biased beliefs.
Let the economy without belief distortion be described by a general extensive form
game with imperfect information Γ = (N,H,A, P, {ui(β, θ)}i∈N , I, G). N is the set of
agents, H is the set of histories including the terminal histories and the initial history, A
is the set of actions, and Ai(h) is the set of actions available to agent i in history h. P is
the player assignment function, which assigns a set of players from N to each history that
is not terminal or initial. The initial history is assigned to Nature. G is the probability
distribution over Ω, and I is the information partition, which for each player, partitions
the histories the player function has assigned to them into information sets. The utilities
{ui(β, θ)}i∈N satisfy vNM-assumptions and depend on the realization of θ from G and
the profile of strategies of Self 1s β = (βi)i∈N .
Let Ai(h) denote the lotteries over the set Ai(h). A behavioral strategy βi of Self 1
of agent i assigns a lottery from Ai(h) to each history h where agent i is assigned to act.
Let Bi denote the set of behavioral strategies available to agent i.
To allow agents have distorted beliefs in Γ, we use Γ to create a continuation game for
the pre-game described in the previous section. In the continuation game following the
pre-game, agents recall signals σˆ, but they have uncertainty over their original signals. We
model this uncertainty over the signals by using Γ to define a set of games for each agent,
each game corresponding to one possible original signal such that in each of these games
there is no uncertainty about the signal Self 0 received. Denote these games Γ(σi), where
σi is the original signal sent by Nature. These games differ in what agents can expect θ to
be in them and for each agent i there is such game for each element in Σi. Self 1 of agent
i then does not know which of the games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} best describe the reality and in
which she is playing. In principle, the information set of each player in the initial history
of the continuation game has as many elements as Ω has. However, to make clear how
the belief distortion concerns the beliefs about the signals Self 0s receive, we partition the
information sets such that the initial histories of the games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} become the
elements of the initial history of the continuation game. The initial histories of the games
{Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} are elements in the partitioned information set in the initial history of
the continuation game, but, in general, itself nontrivial information sets as well. This
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dichotomy of uncertainty in the initial history of the continuation game helps us separate
the information about signals which is affected by belief distortion and the information
within the signals which is not affected by belief distortion. We now form the set of games
{Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} from Γ.
First, we stick with the convention of letting Nature move only once and at the initial
history of the whole game. This means that in the initial history of each game Γ(σi),
the state of the world is already determined, but the players, in general, do not know it.
Therefore, the player assignment function P now assigns, instead of Nature, a player or
players from N to the initial history. 31 Second, players’ beliefs over θ in game Γ(σi)
are given by the conditional distribution G(θ|σi). Third, the information partitions I in
games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} depend on the signal function. Whatever uncertainty the signal σi
does not resolve, is still left in Γ(σi). If the signal function was perfectly informative, that
is, if the elements of the range of the signal function were singletons, then information in
games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} would be perfect. Fourth, the set of players N describes now the
set of Self 1s. Fifth, the initial history of Γ(σi) is (∅, (σi, σ−i), σˆ). Sixth, we denote the
beliefs of others as {F1,j}j∈N,j ̸=i. These beliefs are determined by Self 1s’ inferences about
the original signal and will be discussed in the next section. The beliefs of others are
not informative other than in predicting the actions of others. This ”agree to disagree”
assumption means that agents view the beliefs of others as mistaken, but allows them to
take account how these beliefs, even if mistaken, affect the behavior of others.32 Therefore,
note for now, that these beliefs do not depend on what Self 1 of agent i beliefs the original
signal to be. Seventh, we add a subscript 1 to the payoff functions to denote that they now
represent the preferences of Self 1. N , A, H, P , {u1,i(θ, β)}i∈N , and the beliefs of others
{F1,j(σj)}j∈N,j ̸=i are the same in each Γ(σi) ∈ {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} and these games can now
be written as Γ(σi) = (N,H,A, P, {u1,i(, β, θ)}i∈N , {F1,j}j∈N,j ̸=i, G(θ|σi), I) where σi ∈ Σi.
That is, Γ(σi) is a game where the probability distribution over θ is given by the prior
distribution and σi.
The continuation game following the pre-game, consists of a set of games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈
31An equivalent way to construct the game would be to let Nature move twice: once in the initial history
of the pre-game and once in the initial history of the continuation game. The first move determines the
signal or a subset of the states of the world and the second move the exact state of the world.
32See Minozzi (2013) page 577, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) page 1094, and Aumann (1976).
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Σi} for each agent i. Agents do not know in which of these games they are playing and
use their recalled signal and their knowledge about the prior distribution of signals to
form beliefs.
5.4.4 Beliefs
Beliefs are modeled as probability distributions over the elements in the information sets.
Here, the interesting beliefs are the beliefs Self 1s form about the signals Self 0s received.
Each agent starts the continuation game following the pre-game in the partitioned infor-
mation set that has as many elements as the signal set has. These elements are the initial
histories of the games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi}. When recalling a signal, given the strategy of Self
0, Self 1 of agent i forms a belief system ri. This belief assigns a probability for each
possible signal Self 0 could have received, and equivalently, to each game Γ(σi) in which
Self 1 could be playing.
We define the probability weight Self 1 assigns to the game corresponding the signal
she recalled and the probability weights Self 1 assigns to the games which correspond to
the nonrecalled signals separately. Consider first the recalled signal. Following Be´nabou
and Tirole (2002), the probability of the game corresponding to the recalled signal is given
by the reliability of the recalled signal defined as
ri(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′i, χ) = Pr(σi = σˆ′i|σˆi = σˆ′i)
=
gi(σˆ
′
i)φi(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′i)
gi(σˆ′i)φi(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′i) + χ
∑
σi∈Σi
σi ̸=σˆ′i
gi(σi)φi(σˆ′i|σi)
, (35)
where σˆ′i is the signal Self 1 of agent i recalls. That is, when recalling signal σˆ
′
i, Self 1 of
agent i assigns probability ri(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′i, χ) to her playing in game Γ(σˆ′i). Here gi(σi) denotes
the probability of Self 0 of agent i receiving signal σi.
33 χ ∈ [0, 1] is again the naivete
parameter measuring the degree of Bayesian sophistication.
In the case of a binary signal set, the belief system simply assigns the remaining
probability to the possibility that the true signal is the one not recalled. Here, we want to
33Sticking with the previous definition, formally more correct way would be to denote the probability
of receiving signal σ′ as gi(σ−1i (σ
′)).
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allow larger signal set which complicates things slightly since the remaining probability
has to be divided between many nonrecalled signals. Therefore, for the current purposes,
a simple solution for this problem is proposed, and we define the probability weights of
the signals that were not recalled in the following way. Let σˆ′i still be the recalled signal.
For all σˆ′′i ̸= σˆ′i, the probability weights of nonrecalled signals implied by Bayes rule are
pi(σˆ
′′
i |σˆ′i, χ) = Pr(σi = σˆ′′i |σˆi = σˆ′i)
=
gi(σˆ
′′
i )φi(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′′i )
gi(σˆ′′i )φi(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′′i ) +
∑
σi∈Σi
σi ̸=σˆ′′i
gi(σi)φi(σˆ′i|σi)
∀σˆ′′i ∈ Σi. (36)
Now, if χ < 1 the recalled signal gets more weight than what the Bayes rule would
imply. Hence, we rescale the probability weights of the nonrecalled signals to ensure that
the probabilities sum up to unity. The total amount of probability weight left for the
signals that were not recalled is 1 − ri(σˆ′i|σˆ′i, χ), and the total probability weight that
these signals have according to Bayes rule is
∑
σˆ′′i ∈Σi,σˆ′′i ̸=σˆ′i pi(σˆ
′′
i |σˆ′i, χ). The ratio of these
is used to rescale the beliefs implied by Bayes rule in (36). The probability weights that
the belief ri assigns to the nonrecalled signals are given as follows:
ri(σˆ
′′
i |σˆ′i, χ) = pi(σˆ′′i |σˆ′i, χ)
1− ri(σˆ′i|σˆ′i, χ)∑
σ′′i ∈Σi
σ′′i ̸=σ′i
pi(σˆ′′i |σˆ′i, χ)
∀σˆ′′i ∈ Σi \ {σˆ′i}. (37)
It is straightforward to see that
∑
σ′′i ∈Σi
σ′′i ̸=σ′i
ri(σˆ
′′
i |σˆ′i, χ) + ri(σˆ′i|σˆ′i, χ) = 1. (38)
A complete belief system is a function that assigns a probability distribution over the
initial histories of games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi} to each information set: for all σˆ′i ∈ Σi
ri(·|σˆ′i, χ) =
(
ri(σˆ
′
i|σˆ′i, χ),
(
ri(σˆ
′′
i |σˆ′i, χ)
)
σˆ′′i ∈Σi\{σˆ′i}
)
(39)
where the first element of the pair is the reliability of recalled signal defined in (35) and the
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second element gives the probability weights of the nonrecalled signals and is defined in
(36) and (37). Let r = (ri)i∈N be the profile of belief systems. Note that the belief system
defines beliefs only to the information sets that are reached with positive probability.
The belief system r describes only the beliefs of Self 1s over the set of possible original
signals. The uncertainty that the signal σi did not reveal to Self 0 is still part of the
game Γ(σi). After receiving signal σˆ
′
i, agent i’s Self 1’s beliefs over θ are now given by the
compound distribution of her belief ri and the set of distributions {G(θ|σi)|σi ∈ Σi} in
the games {Γ(σi)|σi ∈ Σi}. We denote this compound distribution and the information
of Self 1 of agent i over θ in the initial history of the continuation game by F1,i.
These beliefs depend on the strategy of Self 0 and the naivete parameter χ. First,
the higher is the probability of recollection that a strategy assigns to an untrue signal,
the less weight the corresponding game tends to get in Self 1’s beliefs. This is where
the forward induction of agents makes it possible for them to doubt memories which
they recall more often than what the prior distribution would imply. Note also that the
belief system depends on the agents’ own strategies, not the strategies of others. This
parallels the discussion in section 4.2 on how the belief externalities are externalities across
information states or alternative histories, and not across agents.
Second, the naivete parameter controls the sophistication of the inference of agents,
and, hence, their ability to this forward induction. χ = 1 is the standard case of full
Bayesian rationality, and this is the case which we have been calling a sophisticated
cognitive technology. In the other extreme of χ = 0, the cognitive technology is naive,
and the reliability is always unity independent of the strategy of Self 0. The literature has
mainly focused on these extreme cases, full Bayesian rationality in Be´nabou and Tirole
(2002, 2006), Be´nabou (2008, 2013), and Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) and full naivete
in Minozzi (2013), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), and Akerlof and Dickens (1984). 34
Here we also allow the intermediate cases of χ ∈ (0, 1). The role of the naivete parameter
is discussed below.
34An exception is Be´nabou and Tirole (2000) where naivete parameter values χ ∈ (0, 1) are briefly
studied.
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5.4.5 Strategies and the Equilibrium
Let β∗i (σˆ) denote the optimal play of Self 1 of agent i given the recollections σˆ and
implied beliefs F1,i and the beliefs of others {F1,j}j∈N,j ̸=i in the continuation game. The
best response of Self 1 depends on the signals and beliefs of others since they affect the
actions of other agents’ Self 1s. The strategy of Self 0 enters the objective function of Self
1 via the information F1,i. First, the best response of Self 1 depends on her information
and, second, the information may affect Self 1’s utility more directly, as is the case with
anticipatory utility.
The indirect utility of Self 1 as a function of the pure actions of Self 0s is u1,i(β
∗(σˆ), θ).
The payoff of Self 0 of agent i when Self 0s are playing pure strategies σˆ can be written
as the discounted indirect utility of Self 1:
u0,i(σˆ, θ) = δu1,i(β
∗(σˆ), θ), (40)
where δ is the standard discount factor.
Let U0,i(φ, σ) be the expected utility of Self 0 as a function of strategy profile of Self
0s and given information F0,i which is implied by signal σi.
35 Self 0’s optimal strategy
φ∗i satisfies for all σi ∈ Σi
U0,i(φ
∗
i , φ
∗
−i, σ) ≥ U0,i(φi, φ∗−i, σ) ∀φi ∈ Φi. (41)
In the equilibrium of the game, Self 0s of each agent choose the optimal awareness strategy
given the optimal strategies and belief formation of Self 1s in the continuation game.
Self 1s’ optimal strategies β∗ are sequentially rational given their beliefs. The notion
of sequential rationality only requires that the actions are optimal given the beliefs, and,
therefore, applies here. On the contrary, for χ < 1, the beliefs are not updated using
Bayes rule, and they, therefore, are not consistent with the optimal strategies. Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium requires consistency and can be applied only to the case χ = 1.
The cases χ < 1 cannot be characterized by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We, therefore,
define an equilibrium, which can be thought of as a generalization of Perfect Bayesian
35U0,i(φ, σ) is the expectation of (40) where the expectation is taken over an outcome distribution
determined by G(θ|σi) and the strategy profiles φ and β∗.
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Equilibrium and which allows the imperfect Bayesian reasoning of Self 1.
Definition 1 (The Cognitive Equilibrium). The triplet (φ∗, β∗, r) is an equilibrium
if and only if
(i) for each agent i, Self 0’s strategy φ∗i satisfies (41) for all σi ∈ Σi,
(ii) for each agent i, Self 1’s strategy β∗i is sequentially rational for all σˆ ∈ ×i∈NΣi,
(iii) Self 1s form beliefs according to (39).
The behavior of agents is characterized by the equilibrium of the game between their
temporal selves. The cognitive equilibrium determines the motivated beliefs given the
supply of beliefs, that is, the cognitive technology, and the demand for beliefs, that is,
the incentives to hold biased beliefs in game Γ. The equilibrium strategies of Self 1s β∗
determine the agents’ actions influenced by their motivated beliefs and the equilibrium
strategies of Self 0s φ∗ represent agents’ cognitive processes.
These equilibrium strategies and beliefs depend on χ. The parameter values χ < 1
should not be thought of as arbitrary deviations from the Bayesian standard but as
different specifications of constraints of the cognitive technology. Technically, χ measures
the sophistication of Bayesian inference of agents, but in our context, it also measures
how much the motivated beliefs depend on the reality and the strategy of Self 0. The
higher is χ, the more constrained the beliefs are and the more they depend on reality.
Also, the higher is χ, the more aware agents are that they might have an incentive and a
tendency to have self-serving biases.
Kunda (1990) argues that an important mechanism for motivated beliefs is a biased
memory search. When forming beliefs, people consult their memory. The possible direc-
tional goals, however, bias this memory search and memories that support the desired
beliefs are more easily recalled than memories that would contradict them. One way to
interpret the parameter χ is that it measures the degree of bias in the memory search.
The lower is χ, the more biased the memory search is, and the more the resulting beliefs
can deviate from reality.
The defined cognitive equilibrium allows us to see an interesting connection between
what we have called sophisticated and naive cognitive technologies. For sophisticated
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Figure 7: A simple game of motivated beliefs
cognitive technologies, that is, for χ = 1, the cognitive equilibrium is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium. However, as χ decreases, Self 1s put more and more weight on their recalled
signal in their information set. For naive cognitive technologies χ = 0, and agents behave
as if they had perfect information regarding the signal Self 0 received. When agents
behave as if they were in singleton information sets, the cognitive equilibrium can be
characterized as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
To see this and the role χ plays clearly, consider an illustrative example, a simple game
of motivated beliefs, with the often used case of a binary signal and suppose the economy
consists of only one agent. Let Θ = {θL, θH} such that θH > θL and let the signal be
determined by the probability mass function
g(θ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩q if θ = θH1− q if θ = θL . (42)
Let the signal function be σ(θ) = θ, that is, Self 0 of agent gets to know her type exactly
and the resulting beliefs can be represented by degenerate distributions: F0 = θH or
F0 = θL depending on which signal the agent received. The signal set is Σ = {θL, θH}.
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This specification can be depicted graphically and is shown in Figure 7. With a risk-
neutral agent, an alternative setting that would lead to the same specification would be
to let the signals be noisy such that the resulting beliefs would have expectations of θH
and θL as is the case in the POUM model of this work.
Self 0’s strategy is to choose the recall rates λ and γ, where λ and γ are the probabilities
of types σ = θL and σ = θH playing σˆ = θL, respectively, in Self 0’s strategy. Self 0’s
strategy can be described as a pair (λ, γ).
Suppose Self 0 receives a signal σ = θL and remembers the correct signal with proba-
bility λ. If Self 1 recalls signal σˆ = θH , she is in the lower right node in the initial history
of Γ(θL) in Figure 7. However, as she does not observe the signal Self 0 receives and as
she knows that she may not have recalled the correct signal she does not know for sure
whether she is in the lower right node in the initial history of Γ(θL) or in the upper right
node in the initial history of Γ(θH). She forms a belief according to (39).
r(θH |θH , χ) = q(1− γ)
q(1− γ) + χ(1− q)(1− λ) . (43)
And since there are now only two signals:
r(θL|θH , χ) = 1− r(θH |θH , χ). (44)
Self 1 did not observe which signal Self 0 received, so she does not know for certainty in
which game, Γ(θH) or Γ(θL) she is playing. She bases her actions on the expectation of
θ:
E[θ] = r(θH |θH , χ)θH + (1− r(θH |θH , χ))θL. (45)
The expectation over θ given in (45) is now the mean of a compound distribution of the
belief system and the degenerate distributions over θ in games Γ(θL) and Γ(θH).
For χ = 1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium characterizes the solution of the game. How-
ever, as the degree of the Bayesian sophistication χ decreases, r(θH |θH , χ) increases and
Self 1 is more and more certain that she is truly playing in the game which the recalled
signal indicates. In the limiting case of χ = 0 the reliability of the recalled signal is unity
and the expectation is E[θ] = θH . In this case of fully naive cognitive technology, she puts
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all the probability weight on a single element in her information set and behaves as if the
information set was a singleton: If Self 0 receives σ = θL, but sends a signal σˆ = θH , Self
1 will behave in the game Γ(θH) as if she had perfect knowledge that the game starts in
the history (σ = θH , σˆ = θH). Note as well, that in this specification the signal function
reveals the exact type of the agent and the games Γ(θL) and Γ(θH) have perfect informa-
tion. Hence, this behavior of players, as if they had a perfect knowledge of all previous
moves in the game, makes their beliefs trivial and allows the use of backward induction
as a solution concept and makes Subgame Perfect Equilibrium enough to characterize the
equilibria.
This illustration is, naturally, generalizable to the more general case discussed earlier.
In the case of completely naive cognitive technology, Self 1 will believe any recollection,
and Self 0 can, therefore, effectively decide what Self 1 believes. This is especially apparent
when the action space of Self 0 is large. A continuous signal set and resulting continuous
action space of Self 0, combined with complete naivete makes it possible for the Self 0 to
continuously optimize the belief Self 1 holds as is the case in Minozzi (2013) and Akerlof
and Dickens (1984).
5.5 Endogenous Beliefs Model
To connect this general cognitive technology with the Endogenous Beliefs Model (EBM)
proposed in Minozzi (2013), we now derive EBM as a special case of our model. First,
EBM relies on a naive cognitive technology and therefore corresponds to the case of χ = 0.
Second, the EBM is defined for games with perfect information and chance moves. We,
therefore, slightly modify our framework by making Nature move last.
Let there be a finite set N = {1, ..., n} of players, each comprising of their Self 0 and
Self 1. Self 1 acts in a general game Γ = (N,H,A, P, {ui(β, θ)}i∈N , G, I). In EBM, an
anticipatory utility term incentivizes the agents to hold biased beliefs. The game lasts
two periods: in period 2, θ realizes and agents gain utility u2,i(β, θ), and in period 1 they
gain anticipatory utility sE[u2,i(β, θ)|F1,i] when expecting their period 2 utility. s denotes
the ”savoring” parameter and measures the value of anticipation. As EBM abstracts from
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discounting, the payoffs in Γ are defined as
ui(β, θ) = sE[u2,i(β, θ)|F1,i] + u2,i(β, θ). (46)
We transform this game of imperfect information to an equivalent game of perfect in-
formation with chance moves Γ′ = (N,H ′, A, P ′, {ui(β, θ)}i∈N , G), that is, we let Nature
move last. This simplifies the information structure of the game as all information sets
become singletons. The game Γ′ is now solvable by backward induction.
The games we use to describe the uncertainty over the Self 0s’ signals in the contin-
uation game are now Γ′(σi) = (N,H ′, A, P ′, {u1,i(β, θ)}i∈N , {F1,j}j∈N,j ̸=i, G(θ|σi)), where
σi ∈ Σi. Agent’s utility in Γ becomes Self 1’s utility in these games:
u1,i(β, θ) = sE[u2,i(β, θ)|F1,i] + u2,i(β, θ). (47)
Nature starts the game. The action of Nature is a realization from the joint proba-
bility distribution of types G(θ). Information in EBM is symmetric, so we let the signal
function be common to all agents. Together with the prior distribution, a signal deter-
mines the posterior distribution G(θ|σ) = F0 ∈ F . The belief represented by F0 is a joint
distribution over the types of which marginal distribution with respect to θi represents
the prospects of agent i. Using a shortcut, we can say that Nature starts the game by
determining a distribution F0 ∈ F over outcomes as is the case in the EBM. Hence, with
a slight abuse of notation, we let Σ = F . Self 1s do not observe the signal and do not have
access to F0. Self 0 of agent i chooses, as before, an awareness strategy φi(·|F0), which,
in general, is a probability distribution over F for each possibly received signal F0 ∈ F .
Denote a pure action of Self 0 of agent i as Fi.
Plugging χ = 0 into (39) gives us the belief system for a completely naive cognitive
technology: for all F ′i ∈ F ,
ri(F
′
i |F ′i , χ) = Pr(σi = F ′i |σˆi = F ′i ) = 1 (48)
ri(F
′′
i |F ′i , χ) = Pr(σi = F ′′i |σˆi = F ′i ) = 0 ∀F ′′i ∈ F \ {F ′i},
where F ′i is the recalled signal. That is, for any recalled signal, Self 1 assigns a probability
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1 for the event that the recalled signal truly represents the state of the world. The beliefs
of agent i in the continuation game are again given by the compound distribution of the
belief system ri over the original signal and the set of possible distributions F over θ.
Now, since the belief system assigns all probability to the recalled signal, when recalling
signal σˆi = Fi, the belief F1,i over θ in the continuation game is simply Fi.
Self 1s’ beliefs regarding the signals are now trivial, and Self 1s behave as if there was
no uncertainty over the original signal. Also, if an agent recalls a signal Fi she plays in
Γ′(Fi) as if it was a subgame. In addition, as discussed, the information sets in a game
with perfect information and chance moves are singletons. All this makes it possible to
solve the game using backward induction. Let β∗i (Fi, F−i) be the subgame perfect play of
Self 1 of agent i in the subgame Γ′(Fi).36
Self 0 knows that her anticipatory feelings depend on her beliefs Fi, but that her period
2 outcomes depend on the objective reality F0. The expected utility of Self 0 is
U0,i(Fi, F−i, F0) = sE[u2,i(β∗(Fi, F−i), θ)|Fi] + E[u2,i(β∗(Fi, F−i), θ)|F0]. (49)
If we restrict the signal choice to pure strategies, as is usually done in the games with
naive cognitive technology and as is done in EBM, the Self 0s’ problem can be written as
F ∗i = argmax
Fi∈F
{
sE[u2,i(β
∗(Fi, F−i), θ)|Fi] + E[u2,i(β∗(Fi, F−i), θ)|F0]
}
. (50)
Knowing how Self 1 will behave given her beliefs, Self 0 effectively chooses the beliefs
of Self 1.37 In the equilibrium, Self 0 chooses Self 1’s beliefs to optimize the trade-off
between the period 1 anticipatory utility which depends on Self 1’s beliefs and the period
2 utility which depends on the true distribution of θ.
Definition 2 (The Cognitive Equilibrium in EBM). The triplet (φ∗, β∗, r) is an
equilibrium in EBM if and only if
(i) for each agent i, Self 0’s strategy φ∗i solves (50) for all F0 ∈ F ,
(ii) for each agent i, Self 1’s strategy β∗i is subgame perfect in Γ
′(Fi) for all Fi ∈ F ,
36Strictly speaking, the equilibrium is not subgame perfect and Γ′ is not a subgame, but as the agents
are behaving as if they were, we use these terms here.
37The freedom in choosing beliefs could be restricted by restricting the signal set F .
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(iii) Self 1s form beliefs according to (48).
As before, the equilibrium of the game between the two temporal selves of an agent
determines the beliefs and behavior of the agent.
5.6 Discussion
The advantage of using a naive cognitive technology is that it allows the use of backward
induction and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and, therefore, makes models with signal
sets containing more than two elements very tractable. In the applications of sophisti-
cated cognitive technologies, the signals are usually binary since increasing the signal set
quickly renders the model too complicated for an analytical solution. Therefore, as usual
in modeling, the choice of the sophistication of the cognitive technology has to be made
between realism and simplicity. A completely naive cognitive technology may be a very
crude representation of human reasoning, but in many cases, it allows a very tractable
solution. Using a more sophisticated cognitive technology makes the model more com-
plicated, but might lead to different results. As can be seen from the comparison of
the POUM model in the current work to the POUM model in Minozzi (2013), a naive
cognitive technology may overestimate the degree of bias and therefore its impact. Also,
some interesting phenomena such as self-traps and self-doubt that can be explained with
a sophisticated cognitive technology cannot occur with a naive cognitive technology as
Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) argue.
6 Conclusion
Over-optimism seems to be an important mechanism for the POUM hypothesis. We have
formalized this mechanism by modeling the means and reasons for belief distortion and
derived the conditions in which the poor majority of voters distort their beliefs enough
to prefer low taxes in the time of voting. The poor do not expropriate the rich because
they themselves believe to be rich someday, and they value these beliefs.
These motivated prospects of upward mobility emerge endogenously as a result of
agents’ choices between anticipation and consumption. The crucial factors in these choices
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are the value of anticipation and the relative differences in anticipation and consumption
between the potential equilibria.
First, the more the likely poor expect to gain in anticipation when forming biased
beliefs, the more biased these beliefs will be. Specifically, if the incomes or perceived
incomes of the rich increase while transfers stagnate, the poor will be more likely to
indulge in optimism and vote for low taxes. Hence, the striking result is that contrary
to the benchmark model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), where the increase in inequality
always increases the demand for redistribution, in our model, an increase in inequality
can decrease the demand for redistribution.
Second, the less the likely poor expect to lose in consumption when forming biased
beliefs, the more biased these beliefs will be. How much the likely poor can expect to
lose in consumption depends on the potential tax rates in different equilibria. Hence, the
smaller is the difference in the potential policy outcomes, the more likely the POUM effect
is. Specifically, if the voters do not think that their vote has an impact in determining
the policy outcome, that is, if they do not act strategically, they always form the most
optimistic beliefs possible and, therefore, vote for low taxes. If the value of anticipation is
low, individually and collectively rational choices diverge, and the poor voters are trapped
in a bad equilibrium. By coordinating in voting for higher taxes, they could achieve higher
welfare. In this case, the likely poor vote against their own self-interest.
The feasibility of the POUM effect also depends crucially on the specification of the
cognitive technology, namely, on the naivete parameter χ. The less constraining the
cognitive technology is, the more voters can bias their beliefs. Therefore the POUM
effect becomes more feasible as an explanation for the limited size of the government in
democracies when we specify the cognitive technology with small values of χ. This can be
clearly seen when comparing the results of Minozzi’s (2013) POUMmodel with our results.
In Minozzi’s model agents are naive and can effectively choose their beliefs without the
restrictions of prior beliefs or reality. When making a more conventional assumption about
the voters forward-looking behavior and setting χ = 1 corresponding to the standard
Bayesian rationality in belief updating, the poor voters cannot bias their beliefs enough
for the POUM effect to occur. This result, however, hinges on the simple specification
with linear policy preferences and a policy choice between complete equalization and
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complete laissez-faire. By exogenously restricting the possible tax policies, we show that
the POUM effect can be an important factor in voting behavior even if we endow the
voters with a more realistic cognitive technology than in Minozzi (2013).
This distinction between naivete and sophistication represents a broader dichotomy of
cognitive technologies for belief distortion in the literature. We have shown the somewhat
hidden, but simple relation between the naive and sophisticated cognitive technologies to
be the different specifications about the strategic sophistication of agents and how the
biased beliefs depend on reality. Formally this distinction comes down to the specification
of the naivete parameter χ. How the various cognitive technologies of motivated beliefs
relate can be seen with the help of the general cognitive technology developed in the
current work. It also makes clear the trade-off in tractability of the model when choosing
between different technologies of belief distortion. A naive cognitive technology may be
very tractable even with a large signal set, whereas, with sophisticated cognitive technol-
ogy analytical modeling is essentially restricted to a binary signal set. On the other hand,
a naive cognitive technology may allow too much freedom in the choice of beliefs and
therefore overestimate the impact of biased beliefs. Also, in some cases, a naive cognitive
technology may miss some important Pareto-inferior equilibria as argued by Be´nabou and
Tirole (2002).
Motivated directional beliefs are not simply new bounds of rationality. They have
benefits, but carry costs, and can be objects of optimization. (Be´nabou and Tirole 2016).
They are therefore well fitted for an analysis built on the rational choice model. Whenever
there is uncertainty, there must also be beliefs, and in most contexts, people are not
motivated solely by accuracy goals when forming beliefs. The functional, affective and
strategic values of beliefs compete with the accuracy goals whenever there is uncertainty,
and, therefore, the potential applications of motivated beliefs are probably almost as
numerous as are applications of beliefs.
References
Akerlof, G. A., & Dickens, W. T. (1982). The economic consequences of cognitive disso-
nance. The American economic review, 72(3), 307-319.
64
Alesina, A., & Angeletos, G. M. (2005). Fairness and redistribution. American Eco-
nomic Review, 95(4), 960-980.
Alesina, A., Cozzi, G., & Mantovan, N. (2012). The evolution of ideology, fairness and
redistribution. The Economic Journal, 122(565), 1244-1261.
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2011). Preferences for redistribution. In Handbook of so-
cial economics (Vol. 1, pp. 93-131). North-Holland.
Alesina, A., Glaeser, E., & Sacerdote, B. (2001). Why doesn’t the US have a European-
style welfare system? (No. w8524). National bureau of economic research.
Alicke, M. D., & Govorun, O. (2005). The better-than-average effect. The self in so-
cial judgment, 1, 85-106.
Aumann, R. J. (1976). Agreeing to disagree. The annals of statistics, 1236-1239.
Austen-Smith, D. (2000). Redistributing income under proportional representation. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 108(6), 1235-1269.
Averill, J. R., & Rosenn, M. (1972). Vigilant and nonvigilant coping strategies and
psychophysiological stress reactions during the anticipation of electric shock. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 23(1), 128.
Baremboim, I. and Karabarbounis, L. (2008), One Dollar One vote. Unpublished.
Be´nabou, R. (1996). Inequality and growth. NBER macroeconomics annual, 11, 11-
74.
Be´nabou, R. (2000). Unequal societies: Income distribution and the social contract.
American Economic Review, 90(1), 96-129.
Be´nabou, R. (2008). Ideology. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(23):
321-352.
Be´nabou, R. (2012). Groupthink: Collective delusions in organizations and markets.
Review of Economic Studies, 80(2), 429-462.
Be´nabou, R. (2015). The economics of motivated beliefs. Revue d’conomie politique,
125(5), 665-685.
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2000). Self confidence: Intrapersonal strategies.
Be´nabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2002). Self-confidence and personal motivation. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117(3), 871-915.
65
Be´nabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Belief in a just world and redistributive politics. The
Quarterly journal of economics, 121(2), 699-746.
Be´nabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2016). Mindful economics: The production, consumption,
and value of beliefs. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 141-64.
Be´nabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). Social mobility and the demand for redistribution:
the POUM hypothesis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447-487.
Bernheim, B. D., & Thomadsen, R. (2005). Memory and anticipation. The Economic
Journal, 115(503), 271-304.
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of political econ-
omy, 56(1), 23-34.
Borck, R. (2007). Voting, inequality and redistribution. Journal of economic surveys,
21(1), 90-109.
Braman, E., & Nelson, T. E. (2007). Mechanism of motivated reasoning? Analogical
perception in discrimination disputes. American Journal of Political Science, 51(4), 940-
956.
Brunnermeier, M. K., & Parker, J. A. (2005). Optimal expectations. American Eco-
nomic Review, 95(4), 1092-1118.
Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. (2001). Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory
feelings. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 55-79.
Carrillo, J. D., & Mariotti, T. (2000). Strategic ignorance as a self-disciplining device.
The Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), 529-544.
Caesar, J. (1476). Commentarii de bello Gallico.
Cook, J. O., & Barnes Jr, L. W. (1964). Choice of delay of inevitable shock. The
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68(6), 669.
Corneo, G., & Grner, H. P. (2002). Individual preferences for political redistribution.
Journal of public Economics, 83(1), 83-107.
Cukierman, A., & Spiegel, Y. (2003). When is the median voter paradigm a reasonable
guide for policy choices in a representative democracy?. Economics & Politics, 15(3),
247-284.
Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R., & Tetaz, M. (2013). Biased perceptions of income dis-
tribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment. Journal
of Public Economics, 98, 100-112.
66
De Bondt, W. F., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Financial decision-making in markets and
firms: A behavioral perspective. Handbooks in operations research and management sci-
ence, 9, 385-410.
Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1998). Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive poli-
tics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2), 497-529.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. Journal of
political economy, 65(2), 135-150.
Gilens, M. (2005). Inequality and democratic responsiveness. Public Opinion Quarterly,
69(5), 778-796.
Hirschman, A. O., & Rothschild, M. (1973). The changing tolerance for income inequality
in the course of economic development: with a mathematical appendix. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 87(4), 544-566.
Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006). Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions:
Why some democracies redistribute more than others. American Political Science Re-
view, 100(2), 165-181.
Jamison, J., & Wegener, J. (2010). Multiple selves in intertemporal choice. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 31(5), 832-839.
Kopczuk, W., & Slemrod, J. (2005). Denial of death and economic behavior. Advances
in Theoretical Economics, 5(1).
Kszegi, B. (2010). Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium. Economic Theory,
44(3), 415-444.
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological bulletin, 108(3),
480.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112(2), 443-478.
Lerman, C., Hughes, C., Lemon, S. J., Main, D., Snyder, C., Durham, C., ... & Lynch,
H. T. (1998). What you don’t know can hurt you: adverse psychologic effects in mem-
bers of BRCA1-linked and BRCA2-linked families who decline genetic testing. Journal
of Clinical Oncology, 16(5), 1650-1654.
Luebker, M. (2014). Income inequality, redistribution, and poverty: Contrasting rational
choice and behavioral perspectives. Review of Income and Wealth, 60(1), 133-154.
Lupu, N., & Pontusson, J. (2011). The structure of inequality and the politics of re-
67
distribution. American Political Science Review, 105(2), 316-336.
Lo¨wenstein, G. (1987). Anticipation and the valuation of delayed consumption. The
Economic Journal, 97(387), 666-684.
Mahler, V. A. (2008). Electoral turnout and income redistribution by the state: A cross-
national analysis of the developed democracies. European journal of political research,
47(2), 161-183.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government.
Journal of political Economy, 89(5), 914-927.
Minozzi, W. (2013). Endogenous beliefs in models of politics. American Journal of
Political Science, 57(3), 566-581.
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008). The trouble with overconfidence. Psychological
review, 115(2), 502.
O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review,
89(1), 103-124.
OECD (2018), Tax revenue (indicator). doi: 10.1787/d98b8cf5-en (Accessed on 07 April
2018)
Okun, A. M. (2015). Equality and efficiency: The big tradeoff. Brookings Institution
Press.
Piccione, M., & Rubinstein, A. (1997). On the interpretation of decision problems with
imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20(1), 3-24.
Piketty, T. (1995). Social mobility and redistributive politics. The Quarterly journal
of economics, 110(3), 551-584.
Rabin, M. (2002). A perspective on psychology and economics. European economic
review, 46(4-5), 657-685.
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of
motivated reasoning on political decision making. Journal of Politics, 64(4), 1021-1044.
Romer, T. (1975). Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear
income tax. Journal of Public Economics, 4(2), 163-185.
Schelling, T. C. (1987). The mind as a consuming organ. The multiple self, 177-96.
Schwardmann, P., & van der Weele, J. (2016). Deception and self-deception.
68
Selten, R. (1975). Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in
extensive games. International journal of game theory, 4(1), 25-55.
Skala, D. (2008). Overconfidence in psychology and finance-an interdisciplinary litera-
ture review. Bank i Kredyt, No. 4, pp. 33-50
Solt, F. (2008). Economic inequality and democratic political engagement. American
Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 48-60.
Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization. The
Review of Economic Studies, 23(3), 165-180.
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political
beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769.
Thaler, R. H., & Shefrin, H. M. (1981). An economic theory of self-control. Journal
of political Economy, 89(2), 392-406.
Tirole, J. (2002). Rational irrationality: Some economics of self-management. Euro-
pean Economic Review, 46(4-5), 633-655.
Trivers, R. (2011). Deceit and self-deception: Fooling yourself the better to fool others.
Penguin UK.
Weinberg, B. A. (2009). A model of overconfidence. Pacific Economic Review, 14(4),
502-515.
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of per-
sonality and social psychology, 39(5), 806.
69
Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1 . Solve first the optimal recall rate given the constraint λ < 1
2(1−q) .
Note that here we are looking for the argument of the maximum in a right-open set.
However, as we will see, the argument of the maximum is the lower and closed bound of
the set and, hence, the maximum exists.
λ = argmax
λ∈[0, 12(1−q))
{
λ[δsyL + δ
2yL] + (1− λ)[δs[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + δ2yL]
}
= argmax
λ∈[0, 12(1−q))
{(1− λ)r(λ)}
= argmax
λ∈[0, 12(1−q))
{
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
}
(51)
The derivative of the argument can be written as
d
dλ
(
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
)
=
[χ(1− q)− q]2 − [χ(1− q)]2
[q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)]2 < 0 (52)
and is always negative, since [χ(1 − q) − q]2 < [χ(1 − q)]2. The optimal recall rate is
therefore the lower bound of the constraint, that is, λ = 0.
The utility, given that the agents chooses λ < 1
2(1−q) , in (12) is independent of the
choice of λ. The best response is the interval λ ∈ [ 1
2(1−q) , 1]. Plugging λ = 0 into (14) and
solving for s yields (15).
Proof of Lemma 2. If s > s∗ the likely poor will choose the awareness rate λ = 0
and will not want to deviate by Lemma 1. In this equilibrium, no one never chooses
σˆi = yL, so the information set following this action is on off-equilibrium path and the
beliefs in the information set following σˆ = yL can’t be defined using Bayer rule or its
variations. If we define p ≡ Pr[σi = yH |σˆi = yL] and require p ≤ q, we rule out the
possibility of players strategically memorizing a low signal in order to end up with higher
expectations. As the profitability of a deviation depends on whether the agents are able
to increase their anticipatory utility by deviating, with these off-equilibrium path beliefs
the likely rich have no incentive to deviate either. Given the strategies of the likely rich
and the likely poor, the policy outcome as function of λ given in (11) implies τ ∗ = 0.
If s < s∗, the likely poor choose the awareness rate λ ∈ [ 1
2(1−q) , 1] and will not want to
deviate by Lemma 1. Given the strategies of the likely poor and the likely rich, the belief
in the information set following σˆ = yL is Pr[σ = yH |σˆ = yL] = 1. Therefore by deviating,
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a likely rich agent would end up believing to be likely poor and lose anticipatory utility.
Hence, the likely rich have no incentive to deviate. The policy outcome as function of λ
given in (11) in this case implies τ∗ = 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 2 there is an equilibrium with low taxes if Uλ0,i−Uλ0,i >
0 ⇐⇒ s > s∗.
Proof of Lemma 3. Solve first the optimal recall rate given the constraint λ < 1
2(1−q) .
Note that here we are looking for the argument of the maximum in a right-open set.
However, as we will see, the argument of the maximum is the lower and closed bound of
the set and, hence, the maximum exists.
λ = argmax
λ∈[0, 12(1−q))
{
λ
[
δs[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]
]
+ (1− λ) [δs[(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]] }
= argmax
λ∈[0, 12(1−q))
{
(1− λ)r(λ)}
= argmax
λ∈[0, 12(1−q))
{
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
}
(53)
The derivative of the argument can be written as
d
dλ
(
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
)
=
[χ(1− q)− q]2 − [χ(1− q)]2
[q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)]2 < 0 (54)
and is always negative. The optimal recall rate is therefore given by the lower bound of
the constraint, λ = 0.
Solve the optimal recall rate given the constraint λ ≥ 1
2(1−q) .
λ = argmax
λ∈[ 12(1−q) ,1]]
{
λ
[
δs[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]
]
+ (1− λ) [δs[(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]] }
= argmax
λ∈[ 12(1−q) ,1]
{
(1− λ)r(λ)}
= argmax
λ∈[ 12(1−q) ,1]
{
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
}
(55)
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The derivative of the argument can be written as
d
dλ
(
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
)
=
[χ(1− q)− q]2 − [χ(1− q)]2
[q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)]2 < 0 (56)
and as before, is always negative. The optimal recall rate is therefore given by the lower
bound of the constraint, λ = 1
2(1−q) . Plugging in the optimal recall rates λ and λ and
solving for s yields (23).
Proof of Lemma 4. If s > s∗∗ the likely poor will choose the awareness rate λ = 0
and will not want to deviate by Lemma 3. In this equilibrium, no one never chooses
σˆi = yL, so the information set following this action is on off-equilibrium path and the
beliefs in the information set following σˆi = yL can’t be defined using Bayes rule or the
variation of the Bayes rule presented in this work. If we define p ≡ Pr[σi = yH |σˆi = yL]
and require p ≤ q, we rule out the possibility of players strategically memorizing a low
signal in order to end up with higher expectations. As the profitability of a deviation
depends on whether the agents are able to increase their anticipatory utility by deviating,
with these off-equilibrium path beliefs the likely rich have no incentive to deviate either.
Given the strategies of the likely rich and the likely poor, the policy outcome as function
of λ given in (11) implies τ ∗ = τ .
If s < s∗∗, the likely poor choose the awareness rate λ = 1
2(1−q) and will not want to
deviate by Lemma 3. Given the strategies of the likely poor and the likely rich, the belief
in the information set following σˆ = yL is Pr[σ = yH |σˆ = yL] = 1. Therefore by deviating,
a likely rich agent would end up believing to be likely poor and lose anticipatory utility.
The likely rich have no incentive to deviate. The policy outcome as function of λ given
in (11) in this case implies τ ∗ = τ .
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 4, there is an equilibrium with low taxes if Uλ0,i−Uλ0,i >
0 ⇐⇒ s > s∗∗.
Proof of Proposition 3.
∂s∗∗
∂χ
=
−δ(τ − τ)q[(1− τ)∂r(0)
∂χ
− (1− τ)(1− λ)∂r(λ)
∂χ
]
[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− τ)(1− λ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q]2 , (57)
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where
(1− τ)∂r(0)
∂χ
− (1− τ)(1− λ)∂r(λ)
∂χ
= (1− τ) q(1− q)(1− λ)
2
[q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)]2 − (1− τ)
q(1− q)
[q + χ(1− q)]2 < 0 (58)
since
(1− τ) q(1− q)(1− λ)
2
[q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)]2 < (1− τ)
q(1− q)
[q + χ(1− q)]2
⇐⇒ (1− τ)[q2(1− λ)2 + 2qχ(1− q)(1− λ)2 + χ(1− q)2(1− λ)2]
< (1− τ)[q2 + 2χq(1− q)(1− λ) + χ2(1− q)2(1− λ)2] (59)
which holds since
q2(1− λ)2 + 2qχ(1− q)(1− λ)2 < q2 + 2χq(1− q)(1− λ) (60)
and 1− τ < 1− τ . Therefore ∂s∗∗
∂χ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4.
∂s∗∗
∂τ
=
δ∆y(y¯ − yL)
[
(1− τ)[r(λ)− (1− λ)r(λ)]]
[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q]2(∆y)2 (61)
where
r(λ)− (1− λ)r(λ) = q
2
[q + χ(1− q)]2(1− q)[q + χ1
2
(1− 2q)] > 0. (62)
Therefore ∂s
∗∗
∂τ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 5.
∂s∗∗
∂τ
= − δ∆y(y¯ − yL)
[
(1− τ)[r(λ)− (1− λ)r(λ)]]
[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q]2(∆y)2 (63)
where
r(λ)− (1− λ)r(λ) = q
2
[q + χ(1− q)]2(1− q)[q + χ1
2
(1− 2q)] > 0. (64)
Therefore ∂s
∗∗
∂τ
< 0.
73
We establish a result that is useful in determining the sign of the partial derivatives
of s∗∗.
Lemma 5. (1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ) > 0
Proof of Lemma 5.
(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)
=
[2(1− q)(q + χ1
2
(1− 2q))(1− τ)− (q + χ(1− q))(1− 2q)(1− τ)]q
(q + χ(1− q))(2(1− q)(q + χ1
2
(1− 2q)) . (65)
Define
a ≡ 2(1− q)(q + χ1
2
(1− 2q)), (66)
b ≡ q + χ(1− q))(1− 2q), (67)
and write the numerator of (65) as
[a(1− τ)− b(1− τ ]q
⇐⇒ [a− b− (aτ − bτ)]q. (68)
The numerator of (65) are positive if
aτ − bτ > a− b
⇐⇒ a(1− τ) > b(1− τ) (69)
which holds since a − b = q > 0 and τ > τ implies 1 − τ > 1 − τ . The denominator of
(65) is positive for all q ∈ [0, 1
2
]. Since both the denumerator and the numerator of (65)
are positive, the expression is positive and this establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 6. Write s∗∗ as.
s∗∗ =
δ(τ − τ)(y¯ − yL)
ιnet(λ, τ)− ιnet(λ, τ)
(70)
where
ιnet(λ, τ) := λ[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + (1− λ)[(1− τ)(r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL) + τ y¯] (71)
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is the ex ante expectation of the expected net income of the likely poor in period 1 given
λ and τ and λ = 0, and λ = 1
2(1−q) . Compute the partial derivative with respect to yH
holding the average income y¯ constant.
∂s∗∗
∂yH
= − δ(τ − τ)(y¯ − yL)[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)]
[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q]2(∆y)2 < 0. (72)
By lemma 5, the derivative is negative for all parameter values, which implies that s∗∗
decreases in yH , when y¯ is hold constant.
38 Compute the partial derivative with respect
to yL holding the average income y¯ constant.
∂s∗∗
∂yL
= − δ(τ − τ)(yH − y¯)[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)]
[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q]2(∆y)2 < 0 (73)
By lemma 5, the derivative is negative for all parameter values, which implies that s∗∗
decreases in yL, when y¯ is hold constant.
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Proof of Proposition 7. Write s∗∗ as.
s∗∗ =
δ(τ − τ)(y¯ − yL)
ιnet(λ, τ)− ιnet(λ, τ)
(74)
where
ιnet(λ, τ) := λ[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯] + (1− λ)[(1− τ)(r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL) + τ y¯] (75)
is the ex ante expectation of the expected net income of the likely poor in period 1 given
λ and τ and λ = 0, and λ = 1
2(1−q) . Compute the partial derivative with respect to y¯
holding the average income yL and yH constant.
∂s∗∗
∂y¯
=
δ(τ − τ)[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)(yH − yL)]
[(1− τ)r(0)− (1− λ)(1− τ)r(λ)− (τ − τ)q]2(∆y)2 > 0 (76)
By lemma 5, the derivative is positive for all parameter values, which implies that s∗∗
increases in y¯, when yL and yH are hold constant.
40
38By letting τ = 1, τ = 0, χ = 0, and δ = 1, we get ∂s
∗∗
∂yH
= − y¯−yL(yH−y¯)2 , which is the result in Minozzi
(2013).
39By letting τ = 1, τ = 0, χ = 0, and δ = 1, we get ∂s
∗∗
∂yL
= − 1(yH−y¯) , which is the result in Minozzi
(2013).
40By letting τ = 1, τ = 0, χ = 0, and δ = 1, we get ∂s
∗∗
∂y¯ =
yH−yL
(yH−y¯)2 , which is the result in Minozzi
(2013).
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Proof of Proposition 8. First, consider part (i). If s∗∗ ≥ s∗∗∗, then always when there
is a low tax equilibrium, the likely rich are worse off in it. So the condition for the low
tax equilibrium implies that the likely rich are worse off in the low tax equilibrium if and
only if s∗∗(χ) ≥ s∗∗∗(χ). Now, it is easy to see that this condition is satisfied for χ = 1
since s∗∗(1) = s∗∗∗(1). This establishes part (i). Consider now part (ii). Show first that
s∗∗(χ) < s∗∗∗(χ) ∀χ ∈ [0, 1).
s∗∗(χ) < s∗∗∗(χ)
⇐⇒ − (1− τ)r(0) + 1
2
(1− τ)r
(
1
2(1− q)
)
+ q(τ − τ) < 0. (77)
Now show that the left-hand side of (77) is increasing in χ. The derivative of the left-hand
side of (77) with respect to χ is
(1− τ) q(1− q)
[q + χ(1− q)]2 −
1
4
(1− τ) q(1− 2q)
[q + 1
2
χ(1− 2q)]2
>(1− τ) q(1− q)
[q + χ(1− q)]2 −
1
4
(1− τ) q(1− q)
[q + 1
2
χ(1− 2q)]2
=(1− τ)q(1− q)
[
1
[q + χ(1− q)]2 −
1
[2q + χ(1− 2q)]2
]
, (78)
where (78) is positive for all χ ∈ [0, 1) since
[q + χ(1− q)]2 < [2q + χ(1− 2q)]2
⇐⇒ [q + χ(1− q)]2 < [q + χ(1− q) + (1− χ)q]2 (79)
for all χ ∈ [0, 1). Hence, the derivative of the left-hand side of (77) with respect to χ
is positive and the left-hand side of (77) is increasing in χ. Since s∗∗(1) = s∗∗∗(1), the
left-hand side of (77) is zero when χ = 1. Since the left-hand side of (77) is increasing in
χ, it has to be negative for χ ∈ [0, 1). This establishes that s∗∗(χ) < s∗∗∗(χ) ∀χ ∈ [0, 1).
Now since s∗∗(χ) < s∗∗∗(χ) ∀χ ∈ [0, 1), an existence of a low tax equilibrium does not
necessarily mean that s > s∗∗∗ and the likely rich are worse off only if s > s∗∗∗. This
establishes part (ii).
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Proof of Proposition 9. Denote the optimal choice of the likely poor by λ∗.
λ∗ = argmax
λ∈[0,1]
{
(1− λ) [δs[(1− τ)[r(λ)yH + (1− r(λ))yL] + τ y¯] + δ2[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]]
+ λ
[
(δs+ δ2)[(1− τ)yL + τ y¯]
] }
= argmax
λ∈[0,1]
{
(1− λ)r(λ)}
= argmax
λ∈[0,1]
{
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
}
(80)
The derivative of the argument can be written as
d
dλ
(
(1− λ)q
q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)
)
=
[χ(1− q)− q]2 − [χ(1− q)]2
[q + χ(1− q)(1− λ)]2 < 0 (81)
and is always negative. The optimal recall rate is therefore given by the lower bound of
the constraint, λ∗ = 0. Since the maximum is unique, the choice λ = λ∗ stictly dominates
all other choices of λ and, hence, the unique equilibrium is all the likely poor choosing λ∗.
Proof of Proposition 10. By Lemma 1, if s < s∗, (34) is greater than (33).
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